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 BEYOND RESOLUTION: WHAT DOES CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION ACTUALLY TRANSFORM? 
 
 
Christopher Mitchell 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper considers the concept of ‘conflict transformation’ in relation to earlier 
ideas concerning the ‘resolution’ of conflict and seeks to differentiate between the 
two approaches. Writers and writings from the conflict transformation ‘school’ are 
surveyed and an effort is made to delineate the core characteristics of the approach, 
viewed either as a process or an end state. Questions are raised about 
transformation on a personal, group or conflict system level, all of which seem to be 
encompassed by various adherents of the transformation school, and the unifying 
concept that emerges is that of the relationship between adversaries being 
transformed by a variety of techniques. However, it is finally argued that the very 
idea of ‘relationship’ is itself ambiguous so that a real intellectual effort needs to be 
made to clarify its nature and characteristics, and the various ways in which 
relationships can be changed.   
 
 Over the last few years it has become increasingly popular in the field of 
conflict studies to contrast processes leading to conflict transformation and those 
that are said to result in conflict resolution, with the strong implication that there are 
major differences between both processes and their respective outcomes, and the 
slightly less strong hint that transformation is a process that will make up for the 
inadequacies of mere resolution. For example, talking of a ‘sea change’ in the way 
conflicts are perceived, Kumar Rupesinghe argues, “…the notion of being able to 
resolve them once and for all has been superseded by an understanding that such 
dynamic and deep-rooted processes call for dynamic and sustained responses…” A 
similar view is expressed by Johan Galtung who states categorically that 
“…conflicts are generally not solved…What survives after a conflict has 
disappeared from the agenda is conflict energy reproduced and produced by the 
conflict. Then energy does not die…it attaches itself to one or more conflicts, 
possibly also the old one…”(Galtung 1995, p. 53)1. 
 Now it may be, as my colleague Ilana Shapiro has pointed out in a personal 
communication2, that employment of this relatively new term of ‘transformation’ is 
a reaction to the growing misuse of the term ‘resolution’ to stand for almost 
anything short of outright victory, defeat and revenge as an outcome, as well as for 
many processes involving overt violence (‘bombing for peace’) or covert coercion 
(economic sanctions to obtain parties’ acquiescence to a dictated settlement) as 
‘resolution’ methods. In short, the concept of transformation has emerged because 
of the corruption of the conception of ‘resolution’ in the sense that the latter is 
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employed indiscriminately to stand for what previously would have been termed 
‘managed’ outcomes and strategies; and would fall clearly into the category of what 
David Bloomfield recently characterized as ‘settlement’ approaches (Bloomfield 
1997). 
 A second explanation for the emergence of the concept of ‘transformation’, at 
least in terms of conflicts that involve individuals and small groups as parties, is 
offered by Bush and Folger (1994). They draw attention to the way in which the 
field of mediation and dispute settlement has changed over the last twenty years 
from one which began at grassroots level, with a focus on bringing about major 
social change, to one which has become a professionalized and organized practice, 
with a major goal of solving problems for clients. Given the co-option of mediation 
and resolution by status quo institutions in society, and their current focus on 
distributive settlements that satisfy needs, Bush and Folger argue that ‘conflict 
resolution’ has become a term associated with the manipulative search for an 
agreement that is satisfactory not merely to the adversaries, but also to the third 
party and the latent interests they represent. They neatly term this a ‘win-win-win 
solution’. Commitment to social change and reform – mediation as a social 
movement – has been abandoned in favor of the search for atomized processes 
seeking agreements that provide superficial solutions to individual problems 
confronted in isolation. “…At its start in the 1960s, the mediation movement was 
indeed considered capable of helping to change the conditions that fueled the 
disorder of that decade…Today, it seems that few think of the mediation movement 
as even relevant to the problems of disempowerment, division and alienation that lie 
at the heart of societal tragedies...” (Bush & Folger 1994, p. 51). Hence the need for 
‘transformation’ rather than ‘resolution’ with the latter’s current implications of 
superficial satisfaction and agreement-itis.       
 Whatever the reason for its emergence, this dichotomy between ‘resolution’ and 
‘transformation’ is, in many ways, a pity. Firstly, because the addition of yet 
another term to those already obfuscating the study and understanding of conflict – 
conflict formation, conflict management, conflict reduction, conflict containment, 
conflict mitigation – seems unnecessary. Secondly, because original uses of the 
term ‘conflict resolution’ appear more than adequate to cover any additional 
implications generally involved in the idea of a ‘transformative’ process or solution. 
For example, John Burton and Frank Dukes in the early 1990’s were writing about 
conflict resolution processes as being those that seek to examine needs and options, 
and reach agreements that not only satisfy those needs but which can also bring 
about changes in existing systems and patterns of relations giving rise to the 
conflicts in the first place (Burton & Dukes 1990). Even before that, in the early 
days of conflict resolution practice, there was a clear understanding that many 
‘resolutions’ certainly implied the need to bring about major structural changes in 
social systems, countries and communities as well as changes in fundamental 
relationships, if the ‘resolutions’ were to be genuinely acceptable, self-supporting 
and durable.  
 Be that as it may, it is worth considering arguments to the effect that conflict 
transformation is a different and perhaps more comprehensive process than conflict 
resolution ever was, and to explore what these differences are. To do so, it is 
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obviously necessary to have a clear idea of what conflict transformation is, what 
assumptions underlie the process, what effects it seeks to have on protracted 
conflicts and how these effects can best be brought about. This is a tall order and the 
task is made no easier by the fact that those who write about and advocate the use of 
transformation procedures have themselves a wide variety of views about what 
‘transformation’ involves and how, when and by whom it can be brought about. The 
one central thing most writers and practitioners agree about is that transformation 
takes the business of coping with destructive protracted conflicts beyond the 
cessation of violence, the achievement of a compromise settlement or even the joint 
creation of an acceptable solution to the issues currently in conflict between the 
adversaries – in other words, beyond resolution. 
 
Resolution and Re-emergence 
 
 Before tackling the major task of delineating the essential nature of conflict 
transformation, however, I think it is necessary to clear up one misapprehension 
about what writers from what might now be termed ‘the resolution school’ mean 
when they talk about conflicts being finally resolved as opposed to settled. This 
claim is rather more modest than sometimes appears. It involves a contention that an 
acceptable and durable solution to the issues in a particular conflict between 
adversaries has been discovered – or mutually created – by the parties themselves, 
possibly with outside assistance from other ‘third’ parties or possibly through their 
own efforts and sometimes with local assistance from ‘insider partials’. It does not 
mean that exactly the same parties may not come into conflict in the future over 
other issues, some of which may even arise from the working out of the agreed 
solution to the original incompatibilities. The final ‘resolution’ of one particular 
conflict does not imply a conflict-free future, especially if the parties involved have 
a long history of enmity, fear or mistrust, although it is to be hoped that the process 
through which a mutually satisfactory solution was devised might have done 
something to diminish some of the dislike and mistrust and, at least, serve as a 
model for what might also be achieved through similar resolution processes in 
future conflicts between the same parties. This is, of course, a most unlikely 
outcome if the ‘solution’ takes the form of a settlement of exhaustion or a temporary 
compromise, partly coerced from the adversaries by a third party a la Dayton. 
 In somewhat different terms, nobody advocating the utility of conflict resolution 
is likely to argue that resolving a particular conflict will remove all differences or 
potential differences between parties3, whether the differences take the form of 
possessing contrasting goals or aspirations or simply being different from one 
another, perhaps as regards language, appearance, religious beliefs, social 
organization or culture. Even if, through some miraculously effective processes, the 
political, social and economic issues currently dividing the Greek Cypriots from the 
Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus could be ‘resolved’, there would still be 
two different (and to a degree socially separate) communities on the island of 
Cyprus – or perhaps three, given the influx of mainland Turks into the Turkish 
Republic of North Cyprus. Undoubtedly new conflicts would arise among them in 
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future, some of which would likely be conflicts that exist at present but are 
suppressed by the currently dominant, inter-community conflict.  
     This argument sometimes appears difficult to support in view of the long drawn 
out conflicts that involve countries, nations and ethno-linguistic communities, such 
as the protracted struggle in Ireland and then in Northern Ireland, or the Franco-
German rivalry between 1870 and 1945, or the complex system of conflicts in the 
former-Yugoslavia. Such conflicts, because they involve ‘the same’ people appear 
to go far back into history and to die down only to re-emerge at a later date. 
Analytically, however, many of such apparently protracted ‘ethnic’ conflicts might 
well turn out to involve quite different issues, some of which probably lend 
themselves to resolution no matter how ostensibly intractable they appear. It may be 
more accurate – and certainly more hopeful – to regard them as series of potentially 
resolvable, interlinked conflicts involving ‘the same’ people4, rather than as the 
same phenomenon that has ‘re-emerged’ because it was not – and could not be – 
resolved during ‘its’ last cycle.5 
 It is true, of course, that some writers in discussing the need for conflict 
transformation have argued the impossibility – or, at least, the unlikelihood – of 
ever being able to resolve certain conflicts, and that all that happens is that they are 
temporarily suppressed or their pursuit neglected in favor of other activities. 
Carolyn Nordstrom, quoting Galtung, talks about conflicts being “...momentarily 
quieted, only to resurface again at a later time and in a different guise...” and 
criticizes the conception of conflicts having a linear form and a final endpoint as 
essentially the result of a ‘Western’ epistemology (Nordstrom 1995, p. 105). 
Clearly, some conflicts do re-emerge fundamentally unaltered, which would 
indicate to me, at least, that the previous solution had taken the form of an 
unsatisfactory, temporary compromise rather than a durable resolution. Such cases 
thoroughly justify Nordstrom’s point that such mis-titled ‘resolutions’ may, 
paradoxically, be aptly named because, unable to deal with them in any final sense, 
we are constantly ‘re-solving them’ (Nordstrom 1995, p. 106).  
     However, other cases may involve the formation of very different conflicts 
involving very new issues, rather than being the same conflict ‘in a different guise’, 
even though they involve the same parties. One needs to ask how ‘different’ a 
different guise needs to be before it ceases to be ‘the same’ conflict that has re-
emerged, rather than a new one. Some careful analysis of the nature of the issues 
involved and the structures underlying their development needs to be undertaken 
before claims of ‘re-emergence’ are made. It is even possible to make a case, for 
example, that the issues in the Irish conflict changed radically enough between 1921 
and 1966 from issues of establishing an independent, united Irish republic to those 
of civil rights for the minority in the North – and then by 1970 rapidly back to 
issues of Irish unity and the partition where the conflict has remained – to be 
regarded analytically as a different conflict. One also needs to recall, when talking 
about protracted ethnic conflicts, Rudolph Stavenhagen’s point that many so-called 
‘ethnic’ conflicts are, on closer examination, examples of social, political and 
economic conflicts between groups who identify themselves and their opponents in 
ethnic terms (Stavenhagen 1991, p. 119). Some apparently intractable ethnic 
conflicts may be over issues only remotely connected with ethnic identity and its 
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expression, while others which are more closely related to ethnicity and its 
manifestations may allow for mutually acceptable solutions once it is recognized 
that ethnic survival is not actually an issue. 
 However, it is also true that such analytical distinctions between what is 
classified as new conflict and what as old, unresolved conflicts newly re-emerged 
may be practically irrelevant. The distinction may only be important in the sense 
that in the latter case the temporary settlement might ideally have been treated as a 
breathing space to enable a durable solution to be sought; and in the former case 
successful resolution of one set of issues might have led on to the exploration of 
conflict prevention measures to minimize residual antagonisms that might lead to 
future conflicts, which will almost inevitably arise and might escalate rapidly into 
coercion and violence. With this in mind, it seems unarguable that conflict 
transformation advocates have a point in holding that it is simply not enough to 
resolve one set of issues between parties who then remain in a mental frame of 
mutual suspicion and antagonism, in a relationship of unloved interdependence and 
locked in a system from which major, salient contentions will inevitably arise. 
Conflict transformation implies that much more than simply finding a solution to 
one set of conflicting interests and values is required. But what?  
 
Formation, Transformation and ‘Standard’ Conflict Dynamics 
 
 Unfortunately, as I have already noted, a variety of somewhat contradictory 
answers are given to that question, depending partly upon which analysts are 
writing and the social level of the conflicts that they discuss. One might start by 
approaching the conundrum linguistically. If the term ‘resolution’ implies the 
process of finding a solution to some problem, then the term ‘transformation’ surely 
implies bringing about some major change in some aspect of the conflict or the 
socio-political system in which it is embedded – or in something else. But at least 
the conception of profound change is implied.6  
     In addition, using the same distinction as I have used elsewhere when discussing 
conflict resolution, it is reasonable to conclude that conflict transformation can 
stand both for an end state (or at least a set of identifiable conditions) when the 
conflict can be viewed as ‘transformed’ and for a set of processes through which the 
end state is achieved. 
     The core of the transformation concept, therefore, involves some kind of major 
change – a qualitative shift, as opposed to a quantitative alteration in degree, as that 
involved had medieval alchemists achieved their ambition of changing lead into 
gold.7 The question that follows must be: What gets transformed? Two obvious 
starting answers are firstly the conflict itself and secondly some aspect of the socio-
political system in which that conflict occurs. 
     Here one immediately runs into the problem that conflicts themselves are 
inherently dynamic phenomena, even when they are in their early stages when 
nobody either involved in the conflict or observing it is even contemplating trying 
to settle, resolve, terminate or transform it. In one – probably misleading – sense, 
conflicts are transforming all the time, from the moment the incompatible interests 
emerge into parties’ consciousness, through the mobilization of support for the 
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achievement of shared goals, the escalation of coercive and eventually violent 
behavior (and inevitably, of the costs of prosecuting the conflict) to the involvement 
of third parties as sponsors, allies or intermediaries. 
 It seems inherently less than useful to confuse the normal and familiar dynamics 
of conflict with its ‘transformation’, but some writers have used the term in this 
fashion. Edward Azar, for example, in his interesting discussion of protracted social 
conflicts, argues that a number of factors lead to the emergence of such intractable 
disputes, and that “…rapid growth orientated economic development strategies [that 
which is primarily practiced by the global community] in underdeveloped countries 
result in the deepening of a dual economy in which the modern sector becomes 
prosperous…while the traditional sector stagnates or even deteriorates as wealth is 
intentionally transferred to the modern sector…” (Azar 1986). This uneven 
development, plus the involvement of different ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious 
communities in the growing or the stagnating sector, leads in Azar’s analysis to the 
transforming of “…nonconflictual situations into conflictual ones…” a change 
which seems quite profound enough to be properly regarded as an example of 
transformation of the conflict (Azar 1990, p. 7). Hence, willy nilly, Azar himself 
might be taken to be an example of writers who treat the emergence of conflict into 
an overt stage of antagonistic competition as being a type of transformation, if not 
necessarily a desirable one. 
 But most other writers in the field do not appear to regard the emergence of a 
conflict as a type of transformation. Rupesinghe takes a most logical approach to the 
question by talking about conflict formation which – while warning that conflicts 
seldom develop in a linear fashion – he likens to birth and infancy of a dispute 
before it grows and develops to maturity and requires some form of ‘managing’ 
(Rupesinghe 1995, pp. 77-78). On the other hand, a number of writers do use the 
conception of transformation to stand for what I would regard as ‘standard’ 
dynamics of conflict and nothing so out of the ordinary as to require that label, even 
though, admittedly, some ‘normal’ conflict dynamics – crossing the threshold from 
coercion to violence, for example – do represent major qualitative changes. For 
example, Raimo Vayrynen argues that conflict transformation can take place in at 
least four different ways (1991, pp. 4-7): 
 
[1] Actor Transformation, which involves either major internal 
changes within the original parties to the conflict or the addition 
[and, presumably, subtraction] of new parties to the conflict. 
[2] Issue Transformation, which involves an alteration of the 
political agenda of the conflict through a transformation of what the 
conflict is “about”. 
[3] Rule Transformation, which involves a change in the norms 
involved in the conflict and the limits within which the parties 
conduct their relations. 
[4] Structural Transformation, which involves changes in the whole 
structure of inter-party relations. 
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     The last type of change certainly seems to conform to what many other writers 
mean by ‘conflict transformation’ and I will return to this conception later in this 
article. The other three types seem much more akin to what most writers on conflict 
processes would regard as the normal dynamics of conflict, although there are some 
who highlight the process of issue change and use the label ‘transformation’ to 
apply to this kind of alteration.8 For example, in their interesting paper on how 
conflicting parties can attempt to shape and define a conflict by ‘re-phrasing’ what 
the conflict is about, Lynn Mather and Barbara Yngvesson argue that this type of 
‘transformation’ occurs at all stages of conflicts, starting as soon as one party 
“perceives a grievance against another” (Mather & Yngvesson 1981, p. 777). 
Further, they argue that while efforts to define what the conflict is about – and to 
have a major influence on how it will be handled and settled – may be part of the 
adversaries’ tactics in prosecuting the conflict, it is also a process employed by third 
parties who redefine the issues in the conflict (what Mather and Yngvasson refer to 
as ‘the content’) in order to make it amenable to particular modes of settlement. 
This is most clearly seen in the process by which disputes and the range of issues 
involved are shaped in a particular way so that they become amenable to legal 
settlement, but there is, the authors argue, a similar ‘transformative’ process 
involved in the use of intermediaries, part of whose function is to present “...a 
formulation which disputants and others might accept and at the same time satisfies 
the interests of a third party...” (Mather & Yngvasson 1981, p. 778). In many ways, 
this last argument echoes that of Dale and Bill Spencer regarding the manner in 
which issues can be altered to facilitate attaining a solution to a conflict so that, in 
their view, conflict transformation “…can be thought of as a redefinition of the 
dispute situation by the actors themselves, one that may lead to opening a space for 
cooperation and peace…” (Spencer & Spencer 1995, p. 162). 
 While there might be an argument for using the term ‘transformation’ to 
indicate a change in the conflict itself that involves a re-definition of what the main 
issues in contention are, there seems to be a clear consensus that the term does not 
apply to other familiar changes that occur during protracted conflicts. For example, 
while Vayryenen might be right in arguing that a conflict will be significantly 
changed by the direct involvement of a patron or by the defection of an ally, such a 
change does not seem to be what most writers mean when they use the term 
‘transformation’. It might, therefore, be more appropriate to use the more limited 
term of conflict ‘enlargement’. Other labels, such as ‘escalation’ or ‘polarization’ 
seem more useful for describing the numerous changes that almost inevitably seem 
to accompany the involvement of adversaries in protracted conflicts, such as 
heightened ethnocentrism, alienation, scapegoating, dehumanization, stereotyping, 
tendencies to create enemy images and what Leo Kuper describes as a general 
‘decline in moderation’ (Kuper 1977). At a socio-political level, common changes 
include a tendency of parties to over-commit and entrap themselves in increasingly 
costly and failing courses of action; in many cases an increase in physical separation 
and a more rigorous enforcement of both social and territorial boundaries; and what 
Pruitt and Rubin refer to as ‘residues’, one of which involves increased national or 
group cohesion and the emergence of militant leadership (Pruitt and Rubin 1986, p. 
92). 
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 No one would deny that these changes are important, nor that many of them 
involve important thresholds which, once crossed, make stopping and reversing the 
dynamic increasingly difficult. But they hardly seem to be the kind of changes, 
however major, that the ‘conflict transformation’ school refers to when it uses that 
term. Nor does it seem to be the case that the changes that accompany both the 
emergence and the escalation of conflicts in a related socio-political system offer 
more than a clue to what is the essential nature of this broader conception of 
‘conflict transformation’. Anyone who has been in a country that has become 
involved in a war, or in a nation or community in which protracted and violent 
conflict has broken out, will be under no illusions about the profound changes 
brought about as a result. Anatol Rapoport (1986) refers to changes involving the 
establishment of a ‘self-perpetuating war machine’ and many others have talked 
about the inevitable ‘militarization’ of society. Protracted conflicts, both internal 
and external, result in major changes in government powers (a national emergency 
or a ‘state of siege’ is declared); in economic organization and activity (mobilization 
of resources for defense or ‘increased security’); and in all social and cultural life, 
including major population disruptions (evacuations, flight, so-called ‘ethnic 
cleansing’). 
 Faced with the kind of major changes that characterize conflict emergence and 
escalation, (what Rupesinghe calls ‘formation’, ‘escalation’ and ‘endurance’) it is 
difficult to argue that these do not ‘transform’ a society or a region in which the 
conflict takes place. However, given that most writers on the subject see the term 
‘transformation’ as applied to changes in the opposite direction, then one way of 
dealing with questions about the basic nature of transformation would be to assume 
that it refers to the reversal of the all negative forms of change that occur within the 
conflict system itself and to the social system in which the conflict is embedded. 
Thus, transformation involves, for example, changes such as an increase in empathy 
on the part of adversaries, with stereotyping, dehumanization and demonization of 
the other side becoming less common; a decrease in the levels of social and 
geographical separation of the parties; and major changes in the nature and 
homogeneity of communications aimed at the others. 
 But do major changes in the conflict and the surrounding socio-political system 
in the direction of the status quo ante really represent an accepted and acceptable 
meaning of ‘conflict transformation’? Clearly there is more to the conception than 
this, for many writers insist that a mere return to the situation before the emergence 
of overt conflict is simply to go back to the very conditions that gave rise to the 
original aspirations for change and goal incompatibilities in the first place. How can 
this be termed ‘transformation’, rather than being simply an unsatisfactory process 
of ‘restoration’? Although there are different emphases in the writing on 
transformation, one of the factors that arises clearly in most is that, while 
transformation implies ‘positive’ change in many aspects of the conflict, the parties 
and the participants, it also implies the need for major changes in the socio-political 
and economic systems from which the conflict originated. This is put most clearly 
by Juha Auvinen and Timo Kivimaki when they argue that “...The philosophy of the 
conflict transformation approach is that in conflicts there are causes or reasons more 
fundamental than are expressed on the level of disputes. Often conflicts are 
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structurally caused by economic, political, identitive, discoursive and other 
structures which then give rise to concrete disputes...” (1996, p. 3). The clear 
implication of this approach is that transformation involves at least the principle that 
some of the things that have to be changed radically are the structures giving rise to 
conflict in the first place. In turn, this suggests that Vayryenen’s fourth category of 
structural transformation might well be the dimension of his framework linking it 
to the core ideas of other writers on transformation processes. 
 Certainly this focus arises from a philosophy of handling protracted conflicts 
which is more far reaching than one which aims at finding an acceptable resolution 
to one current conflict and much further reaching than one which simply attempts to 
alter the behavior of adversaries and to patch together some compromise based upon 
division or compensation. 
 
Core Factors to Be Transformed 
 
 Delineating clearly what is involved in conflict transformation – in the sense of 
the nature, direction and range of changes involved – remains difficult, however. 
This is not always because writers on transformation tend inadvertently to conflate 
the process aspect of the phenomenon with the outcome elements. Partly it is 
because, for some members of the ‘transformation school’, establishing a particular 
process is an end in itself – a desired outcome. Partly it is because others argue that 
conflict transformation is a continuing process in itself, so there can be no end state 
in which a conflict – or something else – is said to be ‘transformed’. Galtung, for 
example, views conflicts as “…phenomena that have no clear beginning or end... 
they wax, wane and transform themselves through patterns of dependent co-
arising...” (1995, p. 52). This view finds echoes in many writings about 
transformation and it is interesting to note the number of occasions on which those 
discussing the phenomenon use the present participle to describe what it involves –  
‘restructuring’, ‘building’, ‘validating’, ‘empowering’, ‘understanding’, ‘training’, 
‘promoting’, ‘participating’, ‘reconciling’ and so on.9 
 
The Transformation Process 
 
     This close intertwining of ideas about conflict transformation as process and as 
outcome necessitates some arbitrariness in trying to answer questions about what is 
changed through that process, and at least a brief description of what normally 
seems to be involved in a conflict transformation process. Again, different writers 
stress different aspects, but most seem to agree that a conflict transformation 
process, in order to be effective, must involve: 
 
[1] Multi-level participation, involving elements from all social 
levels of all the involved parties, from top decision makers through 
middle range opinion leaders to grass roots constituents, including 
those who would normally be excluded from the process and whose 
interests would not be represented in ‘normal’ negotiations.   
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[2] Efforts to empower the ‘underdogs’ in the struggle so that 
solutions and changes can be sought between parties that are more 
equal than they would otherwise be. 
[3] Efforts to ensure that those directly involved in the conflict can 
control the transformation processes to their own satisfaction and 
thus make sure that any outcomes have the approval and support of 
those affected. 
[4] A focus not merely on immediate issues but also on long 
standing traumas and hurts, and on any deep-rooted sense of past 
injustices. 
[5] Brokerage by appropriate intermediaries who understand the 
culture and social structures in which the adversaries are embedded. 
[6] Co-creation of a new understanding of the conflict, how it arose 
and what needs to be changed in order both to resolve it and to 
ensure that other, similar disputes do not arise in future.   
[7] An ability to create and put in place procedures that will 
maintain and continue the changes found necessary to resolve the 
current conflict and prevent others arising in future, or – when they 
arise – taking on a protracted and destructive form. 
[8] The mutual, inter-active education of adversaries about the 
nature of the socio-political and economic systems from which the 
conflict arose and of the dynamics of that conflict; and their 
training in skills that will enable them to deal with that conflict and 
others that may arise in future.  
 
     This is a rather general list which undoubtedly omits a number of key aspects of 
the transformation process in the eyes of some writers, but I would argue that it 
does contain most of the features generally accepted by ‘transformation school’ 
analysts and practitioners. It is, moreover, a list which does begin to offer some 
clues to the continuing question about what transformation transforms, and it 
emphasizes that it is possible to sort out the wide variety of answers to that question 
into three broad categories; those dealing with personal changes, those dealing with 
structural changes; and those dealing with relationship changes. 
 
Transforming Persons 
 
     There will clearly be major differences in what gets transformed depending upon 
the social level at which the conflict takes place and the sociopolitical and economic 
environments for the conflict and those involved. At the interpersonal level, 
transforming persons by definition also involves changing ‘the parties’, and hence 
having a major effect on the conflict. Even with conflicts at the inter-group, inter-
community and international level, however, conflict transformation is held to 
involve a variety of major changes in the individuals involved, both at the level of 
leaders and of followers, a point that has led some critics to argue that the 
aspirations of conflict transformation for affecting protracted social conflicts are 
wildly optimistic. 
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 It is probably the case that, at least at the interpersonal level, Baruch Bush and 
Jay Folger have argued most strongly that in properly conducted initiatives it is the 
parties themselves who become transformed, so that the major change occurs in the 
individuals directly involved in the conflict as adversaries. Bush and Folger are 
quite specific about the form such personal transformation takes. Identifiable 
transformational effects are brought about by a process which “...can strengthen 
peoples’ capacity to analyze situations and make effective decisions for themselves 
and...to see and consider the perspectives of others...” (Bush & Folger 1996, p. 264). 
In short, transformation involves a marked increase in the parties’ sense of 
empowerment or self-determination, and in their capacities for recognition or 
responsiveness to others – and this is the objective of a transformative approach to a 
conflict, rather than either simply reaching an agreement about the issues that 
appear to divide the parties or – even less desirably – having intermediaries 
construct a settlement to which the parties are then expected to adhere. In slightly 
different terms, a transformational mediation process:  
 
…contains within it a unique potential for transforming people – 
engendering moral growth – by helping them wrestle with difficult 
circumstances and bridge human differences in the very midst of 
conflict. The transformative potential stems from mediation’s 
capacity to generate two important effects, empowerment and 
recognition. In simplest terms, empowerment means the restoration 
to individuals of a sense of their own value and strength and their 
own capacity to handle life's problems. Recognition means the 
evocation in individuals of acknowledgement and empathy for the 
situation and problems of others… (Bush & Folger 1996, p. 2). 
 
…can allow parties to define problems and goals in their own 
terms, thus validating the importance of these goals and problems 
in the parties’ lives. Further, mediation can support the parties’ 
exercise in self-determination in deciding how, or even whether, to 
settle a dispute and it can help the parties mobilize their own 
resources to address problems and achieve their own goals…Parties 
in mediation have gained a greater sense of self-respect, self 
reliance and self confidence… (Bush & Folger 1996, p. 20). 
      
     These two quotations indicate clearly that, for Bush and Folger, transformation 
processes and outcomes have a central moral dimension, one which is aimed chiefly 
at the people involved in the conflict as parties. The goal of transformation, they 
argue, “…embodies the premise that it is not only being better off that matters but 
being better”, at least in the sense of having increased capacity to understand and 
decide and to empathize with others. Hence, “…the goal of transformation is unique 
because it involves a supreme value that the other goals do not encompass…” (Bush 
& Folger 1996, p. 30). Conflicts and disputes can be viewed “…not as problems at 
all, but as opportunities for moral growth and transformation…” (Bush & Folger 
1996, p. 81). 
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     Leaving aside for the moment the issue of whether no other approach to coping 
with conflicts involves goals of changing participants or parties for the better – 
whoever is to decide what ‘better’ means – it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that Bush and Folger also view transformation as having social as well as 
personal impacts, so that their view of transformation goes somewhat beyond that of 
changing individuals. The unique promise of mediation, they note, “…lies in its 
capacity to transform the character of both individual disputants and society as a 
whole…” (Bush & Folger 1996, p. 20). However, it is clear that the transformation 
of society is an indirect result of individual transformations, rather than through any 
direct agreements that are devised as solutions requiring social reform or change. 
For these writers, “…transformation does not mean institutional restructuring, but 
rather a change or refinement in the consciousness and character of individual 
human beings…” and they acknowledge that the effects of individual change in 
bringing about social change are likely to be a long time coming – perhaps most 
especially in societies prone to violent and intractable conflicts like Cyprus, Sri 
Lanka or the former Yugoslavia (Bush & Folger 1996, p. 24). They are also rather 
vague about the precise mechanisms for converting personal into social or structural 
transformation, and about whose and how many individual transformations will 
eventually add up to a sufficiently large change to enable anyone to talk 
convincingly about a social transformation.    
     While Bush and Folger concentrate on individual changes in empowerment and 
responsiveness, they are hardly alone in arguing for the need to change individuals 
in some fashion if conflicts are to be changed into something else. Many others 
have argued that the aims of conflict transformation processes should include the 
general promotion of mutual empathy and understanding between parties among 
leaders, opinion makers and grass roots individuals, as well as a sense of shared 
responsibility for the origins and dynamics of the conflict in the first place. 
Similarly, transformation processes should aim at removing the sense of 
helplessness about the conflict among participants, particularly those at the local 
and grass roots levels of the parties and at increasing the sense of empowerment, at 
least in terms of their being able to affect the conduct of the conflict, its resolution 
and the structures that originally gave rise to it. At this individual level, 
transformation is usually said to be characterized by major and widespread changes 
in peoples’: 
 
[1] Framing and understanding of the issues in conflict. 
[2] Acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the other party, its 
claims, concerns and hopes. 
[3] Sense of responsibility for the origins of the conflict and the 
interactive manner in which it has inevitably been prosecuted. 
[4] Consciousness of the other party’s perspectives and objectives, 
and reasons for their being held. 
[5] Recognition of the need for short-term mutual re-assurance and 
the building up of longer-term trust between the parties. 
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[6] Sense of competence and capability in confronting the search 
for solutions to the conflict and undertaking actions to prevent 
repetition. 
[7] Willingness to include the interests of those not normally 
represented in the search for solutions, including future generations.  
[8] Acknowledgement of the existence of past grievances, injuries 
and traumas plus a willingness to examine these thoroughly and to 
search for means of healing the damage caused through a variety of 
means, including reconciliation and a mutually acceptable process 
of restorative and – if necessary – redistributive justice.  
[9] Acceptance of the need for a durable, inclusive and acceptable 
solution to a mutual problem, which may involve major structural 
change. 
 
       Many writers have also suggested that one essential element in a conflict 
transformation process is that those involved should recognize that the activity also 
concerns a search for social justice and that part of this, in itself, involves them in a 
mutual effort to define the nature of this elusive idea and what, exactly, a just 
solution to their conflict would look like. In this sense, then, individuals will need to 
become willing to change their usually monocular view of ‘justice’ and ‘a just 
solution’ to one which admits the possibility of more than one conception of what 
might be seen as ‘just’, together with a concomitant need to engage in some form of 
wide ranging discussion about what criteria of justice or ‘fairness’ should be applied 
to some range of possible outcomes. In this way, it is argued, a peaceful solution to 
a conflict has a greater chance of also being a just one, and thus being durable. 
 
Transforming Structures 
 
 If there is one area in which some conflict transformationists argue that 
transformation differs from resolution, it is in the former’s explicit commitment to 
bringing about major ‘structural’ change, and the need for this if a conflict is to be 
permanently transformed into something else. In opposition to this view, it could 
justifiably be argued that both theorists and practitioners of conflict resolution are 
tolerably familiar with situations in which it becomes clear at some stage in the 
process of resolution that a durable and mutually acceptable solution is only 
possible with some level of structural change, either political or socio-economic. 
Often this is clearly revealed by the resolution process itself, together with the likely 
long- and short-term costs of not changing.  
 For example, the protracted and very violent internal war in Liberia during the 
early to mid-1990s was, to a large degree, over who and which faction would 
control a highly centralized presidential political system, together with the power 
and access to wealth that accompanied that outcome. In the initial stages of a 
process hopefully intended to be resolutionary, it became increasingly obvious that 
such a structure could only result in the conflicting parties achieving a win-lose 
outcome, so that the Liberian political system, at least, had to undergo a major 
structural change – decentralization, local autonomy, shared local/central control of 
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national wealth – if a durable solution was to be achieved. In the event, a 
compromise settlement involving a cease fire and supervised elections within the 
existing political system was achieved. The winning faction took power and now 
tries to maintain its position by persecuting any serious opposition while awaiting 
the next, probably violent attempt to transfer centralized power to another faction. 
 This is a not too untypical example of a process of conflict resolution at least 
identifying the parameters of a solution clearly involving structural change, but 
failing then to influence official processes that resulted eventually in a temporary, 
win-lose settlement. It certainly illustrates Rupesinghe’s critique of one aspect of 
the ‘resolutionary’ approach, especially its reliance on small group, problem solving 
workshops from which “...successes are unlikely to be transferred in any meaningful 
way to the conflict ...” (Rupesinghe 1995, pp. 75-6). 
     While conflict resolution approaches clearly allow for necessary structural 
change, it is certainly the case that there is, at least, a difference in emphasis 
between approaching a conflict with this possibility in mind and the 
transformationist approach that assumes that only through such change might the 
conflict, the people involved and the future be altered permanently so that this 
conflict is wholly changed and other conflicts do not recur.10 This may seem to be 
an over-generalization about conflict transformation, and to be clearly connected 
with the kinds of protracted and intractable conflicts on which transformational 
writings concentrate, but it is the case that the need for structural change forms a 
major theme in much of this analysis. 
For example, in Rupesinghe’s survey of the transformational literature there 
appear two clear strands in thinking about structural reform. The first involves the 
need for “...sustainable structural and attitudinal changes...within society and new 
institutions...to address outstanding issues...” The second advocates “... the building 
and/or revival of indigenous political, social and economic mechanisms and 
attitudes which militate against the sue of violence to resolve conflicts...” 
(Rupesinghe 1995, pp. 76-7). These themes of the need for long term structural 
change and the need to revive neglected traditional means for dealing with conflicts 
are echoed by many other writers.   
 
Transforming Relationships 
 
 The third major theme in writings on conflict transformation involves the need 
for changes in the ‘relationship’ between the adversaries, and that a lasting 
transformation of the conflict must involve such a restructuring if it is to be 
successful. Some advocates do talk about the need to create or restore a relationship 
but this expression seems to me to miss the point that adversaries are already 
involved in a relationship, however unsatisfactory as this might be, so that the 
adversary relationship has to be fundamentally changed before one can speak of the 
conflict being transformed. 
 This point is echoed in some of the earlier work of Adam Curle, one of the 
scholar-practitioners most influential in incorporating this idea of the necessity for 
relational change into the conflict transformation approach (Curle 1971). One of 
Curle’s central themes is the need for parties to move from ‘unpeaceful’ to 
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‘peaceful’ relationships, defining the former as those which impede all round human 
development and which are characterized by unbalanced power relationships and 
inequality in the level of awareness about the actual degree of incompatibility in 
their interests and objectives. Peaceful relationships on the other hand are those 
which involve “...active association, planned cooperation and intelligent efforts to 
forestall or resolve potential conflicts...” and in these relationships “...there is 
neither domination not imposition. Instead, there is mutual assistance, mutual 
understanding, mutual concern and collaboration founded on this mutuality...” 
(Curle 1971, pp. 15-16). Thus, for Curle, the defining characteristics of peaceful 
relationships are equality or balance of capability, mutuality and the sense of an 
equal degree of concern between people, and reciprocity in the sense of a balanced 
exchange of material and non-material goods. A similar view of the kind of 
relationships that need to be achieved for conflict transformation to occur can be 
found in the work of Hiskias Assefa, who argues that a necessary process involved 
in such a change moves a society or community from a social order based upon 
hierarchy and coercion to one based upon equality, respect, participation, 
voluntarism and mutual enrichment (Assefa 1993, pp. 5-7). 
 The precise transformation process employed to reach such an outcome depends 
to a large degree on the type of conflict existing in the society or community to be 
transformed, according to Curle. In cases where the adversaries are equally aware of 
the existence and nature of the goal incompatibility, and are roughly equal in their 
capacity to harm each other in pursuit of their interests, negotiation, mediation or 
conciliation could well be relevant processes for achieving a new and stable 
relationship. In circumstances where the adversaries are aware of their conflict but 
capability is one sided, then processes aimed at equalization are appropriate. In a 
third situation, where capability is imbalanced, awareness low – at least on one side 
– and the conflict latent rather than overt, Curle advocates processes aimed at 
increasing awareness to the point of confrontation over newly recognized key 
issues. All these are strategies which provide clear guidelines for transformational 
activities in a variety of structural situations, and at least provide some answers to 
an issue on which conflict resolution literature tends to be silent – the role of 
resolution processes in conflicts which are highly unbalanced and especially in 
those which are so unbalanced that no overt signs of conflict even exist to signal a 
need for resolutionary efforts. 
 Both Curle’s and Assefa’s work provide some clues as to what kinds of 
relationships need to be transformed through a transformation process, and what 
they need to be transformed into, and this line of thought has also been enriched by 
some of the writings of Harold Saunders, who argues strongly that changing 
relationships between adversaries is the core to long term success in bringing peace 
in even the most intractable conflicts. Saunders make the important preliminary 
point that relationships between parties have to be considered in their totality, and 
that they both have multiple qualities and are dynamic, two points to which I will 
return below (Saunders 1993, p. 8). 
 Further ideas can be sought in the work of John Paul Lederach, who focuses his 
own approach to transforming a conflict on processes of reconciliation between 
adversaries in protracted conflicts and draws upon long experience of efforts to 
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transform conflicts and relationships among combatants in Nicaragua, Spain and 
Somalia. Lederach makes the interesting if neglected point that, in many protracted 
conflicts in the contemporary world, it is simply not possible for the adversaries to 
disengage and have little or nothing to do with one another once a particular set of 
contested issues has been ‘solved’. As Lederach puts it, a solution cannot be 
“...pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting 
groups’ affiliations...” because “...relationship is both the basis of the conflict and of 
its long term solution...” (Lederach 1997, p. 26). Willy nilly, the groups or 
communities or societies in conflict have a relationship now – they are adversaries 
– and they will have one in future, at least as neighbors. The question has to be: 
What sort of neighbors can they be or do they want to be? Lederach reminds 
adversaries that in all contemporary internal conflicts, “...the futures of those who 
are fighting are ultimately linked and interdependent. Opportunity must therefore be 
given for people to look forward and envision their shared future...” (Lederach 
1997, p. 26). His recommended approach involves a complex process of 
reconciliation so that more complex but above all more accurate images of “the 
enemy” can be developed, preparatory to changing the manner in which those 
involved inter-act and the basic nature of the relationship that will link them in the 
future, once the underlying issues currently in contention have been mutually 
delineated and solutions successfully sought. 
 Among a number of practical example of relationship building, Lederach gives 
the example of the Norwegian sponsored talks between Israeli and Palestinian 
representatives near Oslo, and notes how – over a long period of time – those 
involved began to build new and deeper relationships, no longer viewing one 
another uni-dimensionally, simply as enemies but more complexly as humans-in-
the-round (Lederach 1997, pp. 32-4). Together with capacity building, relationship 
building forms one of the major parts of Lederach’s transformational approach to 
conflict and peace building and is, he argues, that aspect of the process that 
“...responds to the longer term and coordination requirements needed to sustain 
peacebulding...” (Lederach 1997, p.109). 
 
Relationships: Types and Characteristics 
 
 Unfortunately, amid all the writings of the transformational school on the core 
role of ‘relationship’ and the essential part played by relationship building in 
conflict transformation, the central concept itself remains somewhat vague. At one 
level, it is clearly the case that there are many different relationships possible 
between any two (or more) individuals, groups or communities. Changing two 
groups from adversaries to something else would undoubtedly indicate that a 
situation of conflict has been transformed – also to something else. As the Arab 
proverb has it: “The best way to destroy your enemy is to make him your friend”. 
 But what kind of new relationship might replace that of being adversaries? 
Clearly, it might be possible to change erstwhile adversaries into partners or 
colleagues. However, if one is interested in analyzing when such a relationship 
changes – and by implication, conflict transformation – has occurred what might be 
the most reliable indicators of the new relationship? Behavior towards one another?  
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Nature, extent and balance of inter-actions between the groups? Views, attitudes, 
images, beliefs and other psychological states? Degrees of trust? And how 
widespread do these changes have to be within a society or community before the 
transformation has occurred, given the fact that, for many people, negative views of 
a long time adversary are difficult to alter and can be passed on from generation to 
generation? 
 A third puzzle is less concerned with the type of new relationship to be built as 
a replacement for the old one, or with the indicators that the relationships has, 
indeed, changed, but more with the characteristics of this new relationship. The 
argument here is that, while it is possible for individuals, groups and communities 
to be categorized into a variety of relationships and roles – adversaries, colleagues, 
neighbors, superiors, fathers, communicators – within each of these kinds of 
relationship it remains possible for those involved – and the relationship itself – to 
display very different qualities. For example, it is possible to be a good or a bad 
neighbor – or a thoughtful or indifferent father. As President Kennedy once 
indicated, it is even possible to be in an adversary partnership. The whole issue of 
the kind of relationship, or the qualities within that relationship, needs much more 
careful consideration before it becomes possible to use it as an analytical tool for 
understanding the nature of conflict transformation. 
 Sociologists and others who have discussed the nature of inter-personal 
relationships take as their starting point the idea that relationships involve at least 
two related dimensions, one behavioral and one cognitive or affective. A generally 
agreed basis is that a relationship involves sequences of interactions between 
entities (e.g. individuals that are known to one another) that continue over some 
substantial period of time. To quote Robert Hinde, “...A relationship implies first 
some sort of intermittent interaction between two people, involving exchanges over 
a period of time...” (1979, p. 14). This initial definition echoes that used by Hal 
Saunders, who describes international relationships as “...a continuous political 
process of complex interaction among significant parts of whole bodies politic 
across permeable borders...” (Saunders 1993, p. 6). 
 Systems theorists have emphasized that inter-personal and social exchanges can 
involve three types of flows – material, energy or information – but Hinde makes 
the important point that relationships not only involve content (i.e. what is being 
exchanged or what behaviors are taking place) but also qualities, the latter 
providing a context within which the nature of an interaction can be categorized and 
distinctions made. For example, the physical action of a blow on another’s back 
may be an assault or a boisterous greeting or a warning of approaching peril. 
Quoting Saunders, there are “...relationships of different levels, kinds and 
qualities...” (Saunders 1993, p. 8). 
 Clearly, the nature of particular relationships is determined to some degree by 
content, by what is exchanged, and how it is exchanged. Equally clearly, their 
nature or quality is affected by the cognitive/affective dimension – that is, by what 
those involved in the exchange think of the interaction and of each other’s role in it. 
Relationships are not simply patterns of interaction but also involve memories, 
expectations and evaluations on the part of those who are part of the exchange – 
what Hinde describes as “...the social meaning to the actor...” (Hinde 1979, p. 22). 
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These factors help to explain both why relationships can persist overtime in the 
absence of any interaction at all (as good friends or as historical rivals) and why 
they can change radically, even without change in their basic content. 
 This discussion does begin to offer some clues as to how one might begin to 
analyze the nature of, and – eventually – the reasons for the changes in relationships 
held to be the essential feature of conflict transformation. If relationships consist of 
some continuous patterns of exchange plus the evaluations of those involved in the 
patterns, both of which enable inferences about the nature or quality of the 
relationship to be made, then any efforts to change the relationship as a part of 
transforming a conflict can involve altering the content of the exchange, parties’ 
evaluation of the exchange – and thus of the relationship – or both. In one case, this 
process can involve altering the exchange from one imposing costs through 
coercion or violence to one conferring benefits (or at least doing no harm). In 
another it can involve a complete change in the content of an exchange – from 
tribute to trade – and in the evaluation of that exchange – from resentment to 
approval. 
 Even such a preliminary discussion of relationship change as the one above 
reveals the complexity of the process if an adversarial relationship in a conflict 
[whether manifest or latent] is to be ‘transformed’. As I noted earlier, Adam Curle 
makes the change from ‘unpeaceful’ to ‘peaceful’ relationships the central pillar of 
his approach to the task of transforming conflicts into non-conflicts, but what 
precise changes in the nature of that being exchanged and in parties’ evaluations of 
the relationship are needed to bring about such an alteration? The difficulty is that 
there are many possible evaluations of a pattern of exchange and thus many possible 
qualities of a relationship that could be altered in any process of relationship 
‘transformation’. At one level, transformation could involve a change in parties’ 
evaluation of the relationship so that it moves from fearful to confident, hostile to 
friendly, concealing to open or mistrustful to trusting. At another, the relationship 
could move from being central to being peripheral. It could become static as 
opposed to dynamic, or stable as opposed to unstable or responsive as opposed to 
indifferent. 
 It seems that there is a major need to those advocating major changes in 
relationships as a means of transforming conflicts to specify which qualities of 
existing, adversarial relationships need to be changed for a genuine 
‘transformation’ to occur, and how such changes might be indicated. As a tentative 
starting point, I would suggest that four key qualities, dimensions or aspects of 
existing relationships that might well be changed – somehow – to form the basis of 
a transformative change are: 
 
[1] From imbalanced to balanced exchanges, at least to the point 
where all parties are more or less disposed to agree that they get 
roughly the same value from the exchange as the others. 
[2] From dependent to interdependent exchanges, so all parties’ 
fortunes and futures are more or less equivalently tied to the 
continuation of the exchange. 
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[3] From dissonant to consonant evaluations of the exchange, in 
that all the parties share similar views about it utility and each 
others’ acceptance of the exchange. (No more ‘happy slave’ 
misperceptions on the part of masters.) 
[4] From non-legitimized to legitimized evaluations of the 
exchange, so that all parties more or less accept its essential 
‘rightness’ – and even ‘justice’ – and are content with its 
continuation in, roughly, its present form.       
 
Conclusion 
 
 I started this article with a query regarding the differences between the ideas of 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation and – to be honest – some skepticism 
about the existence of any major differences, given the original meaning of the first 
idea and its acceptance of the possible need for major changes if some conflicts 
were ever to be fully resolved. I am now less sure that the two are simply different 
words for basically the same phenomena. Clearly the two approaches are closely 
related and have many things in common which, in turn set them aside from the 
‘management’ approaches currently being mislabeled as conflict ‘resolution’. As 
processes both resolution and transformation tend to avoid or minimize the use of 
‘leverage’ in attempting both to get adversaries (or their representatives) into face-
to-face interaction or to get them to accept agreements or arrangements about which 
they have serious doubts.11 Both emphasize the importance of participants being in 
control of meetings, as well as the parties being in control of the overall process, at 
least in the sense that they can withdraw at any time without loss. Both 
acknowledge the importance of intangible issues in the causation and the resolution 
of conflict. Both are viewed by their practitioners as adjuncts – if important adjuncts 
– to formal, official efforts to bring protracted conflicts to some kind of satisfactory 
conclusion. 
 On the other hand, there are differences, if only in approach and emphasis. 
Resolution has tended to deal with conflicts by operating close to official efforts and 
to deal with decision making elites or, at least, with opinion makers and influentials. 
Transformation both advocates and practices the conception that processes have to 
take place at all levels, including the very grass roots. Resolution has a tendency to 
concentrate upon the immediate and the shorter term, its advocates arguing that 
dealing with the issues and the deeper interests producing a current situation of 
intractable conflict is enough of a problem in itself. Transformation has deliberately 
included ‘the aftermath’ in its focus, purposefully building in approaches and 
processes that deal with conflict ‘residues’ – traumas, fears, hurts and hatreds – 
which, even if one major conflict has been resolved, will remain to poison futures 
and ensure that later conflicts will be prosecuted in a spirit of intransigence, if not 
revenge. 
 If there is one significant difference, which is not merely one of emphasis, it 
seems to me that it reveals itself in the attitude of the two approaches to the matter 
of structural and relational change and their role in coping with protracted conflicts. 
As I remarked earlier, the possibility – even the likelihood – of the need for 
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structural change is fully accepted within the conflict resolution approach and it is 
acknowledged that in many cases, resolution without major change is simply not 
possible. The process of conflict resolution is partly aimed at getting parties to 
understand the likely long-term costs of not changing, and of finding alternative 
ways of changing that avoid both the costs of continuing ‘defensive’ coercion and 
of apparent surrender. However, within a conflict resolution framework, it is also 
quite conceivable for a resolution to be achieved without necessarily involving 
major structural changes. Furthermore, changes in relationship are not afforded a 
central place in resolutionary approaches; it being usually assumed that these will 
‘naturally’ follow once the conflict at issue has been successfully resolved. The lack 
of attention to this relational aftermath aspect of resolution almost seems to become 
a philosophy of: No conflict = new relationship! 
 In contrast to these two elements in the overall resolutionary approach, conflict 
transformation clearly assumes that major structural changes will always and 
inevitably be necessary conditions for any successful effort to deal with the conflict, 
and that only by seeking such structural change will future conflicts not arise from 
similar sources. For transformationists, the central objective of the process is 
structural change, for all else flows from that. Moreover, new – and improved – 
relationships between erstwhile adversaries do not simply and ‘naturally’ arise from 
the fact that they are no longer in contention over a limited number of – admittedly 
– salient issues. Relationships have to be replaced and rebuilt through deliberate and 
directed efforts, and reconciliation can only take place as a result of these efforts. 
Without this aspect of change, even major structural alterations may prove fruitless 
in heading off future disputes, clashes, crises and conflicts. Hence, while structural 
change is axiomatic, relational change is also a fundamental part of transformation. 
 This being so, there may be something to be learned from my colleague Ilana 
Shapiro’s argument that, if one is comparing conflict transformation with more 
traditional management or settlement approaches, the basic philosophical 
differences revolve around a conservation/change axis. The settlement approach – 
mediation, conciliation, negotiation – starts from an acceptance of a given political 
and socio-economic status quo, which may need some adjustment but is 
fundamentally sound and within which solutions to conflicts could and should be 
found. Fair elections will be the solution to the conflict in Liberia over which 
faction controls the political system and the economy. Eritrea is an integral part of 
an existing, recognized state, so solutions will have to be sought within that 
framework. Solutions to protracted conflicts in Central American countries must be 
sought without major land redistribution or undermining the concept of private 
property. 
 The transformational approach, however, begins by assuming that there is 
nothing sacred about the status quo – indeed, it is probably the source of the conflict 
– so that the process starts with an analysis and critique of the existing system and 
an assumption that it will be necessary to create new systems, structures and 
relationships. It then proceeds with the objective of helping to bring about such 
change, on the argument that only this type of alteration will deal with the conflict 
long term. The contemporary structure and number of ‘independent, sovereign 
states’ in international society not being sacred, there may be a case for some kind 
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of independence for Eritrea. Land reform may be necessary for stability and peace 
in Central America. The political system in Liberia may need to be wholly reformed 
rather than relying upon monitored elections, however ‘fair’, conducted within the 
present system. 
 This is an interesting line of thought to be pursued, but my final question is 
where this distinction between settlement and transformation leaves conflict 
resolution. I would hope that it would occupy its old position on the side of major 
political and socio-economic changes when these are clearly necessary, but it may 
be that it is or has become an inherently conservative activity. I intend to explore 
this possibility in a future article.         
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Leaving aside what is meant by conflicts disappearing from an agenda, there 
seems to be no inherent reason why conflict-generated ‘energy’ cannot be redirected 
into other channels different from seeking further conflicts. On the other hand, if 
‘energy’ is interpreted as organizational capacity for violence, together with a 
conflict ready mind set and no immediately available alternatives, so that there 
exists a ‘conflict habituated’ system in Louise Diamond’s words, Galtung 
undoubtedly has a point as the survival of NATO and the US search for new 
enemies and new wars indicates. However, these are ‘new’ conflicts, not old ones. 
 
2. This idea was initially mentioned in an unpublished paper by Ilana Shapiro, for 
which I am much indebted to her. 
 
3. Except in the relatively rare cases in which the conflict is the sole raison d’etre 
for the existence of the parties involved in the dispute, or for one of them. 
 
4. Louis Kriesberg, in his excellent text book on social conflict, makes the point that 
certain entities are potentially ready to be parties on conflicts through their existence 
and their ability to take up issues in conflict – states, ethnic communities, religious 
organizations, etc.  
 
5. Strictly speaking, many protracted conflicts that take place episodically, may 
involve the same ‘nations’ or ‘communities’ but they can hardly involve the same 
people. Unless the Irish add incredible longevity to their other qualities, the Irish 
nationalists who rose against the British in 1916 were a different generation from 
the civil rights protesters of the late 1960s, and they in turn, a different generation 
from the current members of the IRA, Sinn Fein and the INLA. 
 
6. Some who write about conflict transformation and who wish not to be identified 
with ‘linear, western’ thinking, imply that transformation has to be regarded as an 
on-going, continual process, with no final end state. However, such a view seems to 
imply that transformation is simply synonymous with ‘change’ but even in this 
argument use of the term seems to involve major as opposed to minor change in 
certain things, so that as different degrees of change are involved it would seem 
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possible – and useful – to be able to indicate when the major changes have been 
completed. 
 
7. Conflict transformers may, indeed, turn out to be the social alchemists of the 
early 21st century. 
 
8. As I emphasize in a previous working paper (Mitchell 1999a) changing the 
agreed definition of ‘what the conflict is about’ and uncovering the nature of 
underlying issues in the conflict lie at the heart of conflict resolution processes, so 
this feature is clearly one shared by both approaches. 
 
9. In line with this trend is the title of John Paul Lederach’s latest book, Building 
Peace. 
 
10. In line with this argument, Frank Dukes remains convinced that, at least at the 
level of ‘public policy’ disputes involving conflicts between local communities and 
government and other agencies, conflict resolution approaches should be a 
“...vehicle for changing governing practices and institutional culture of agencies, 
public officials, citizenry and communities...” and that conflict resolution remains 
“…a vehicle for social justice and transformation…” (1993, p. 47, 46). 
 
11. While certainly avoiding ‘mediation with muscle’ it is really impossible for 
conflict resolvers or transformers to have no influence at all on the course or 
outcome of discussions – unless they remain totally silent, which is unlikely. 
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 PEACE BUILDING ARCHITECTURE 
 
 
Luc Reychler 
 
 
Peace Re-Search 
 
In the sixties the green and the peace movements alerted the international 
community of the deterioration of the environment and of the danger of nuclear 
conflicts. Since then, the green movement has been transformed into political 
parties, departments, jobs, environmental impact assessments and several 
international regimes. The first publication of the Club of Rome in 1972, Limits of 
Growth, had a catalyzing effect for raising life and death questions that confront 
mankind and claiming that planetary planning was the most important business on 
earth (Meadows 1972). The peace movement, on the other hand, evolved 
differently. There were some peak moments such as the peace marches in the 
eighties, but the impacts were weaker and less decisive. One explanation is that the 
peace movement had to cope with the strong bureaucracies of foreign offices and of 
defense departments that claimed the expertise. Another explanation is that a great 
deal of the peace movement does not define peace as a collective good. Being 
removed from the embedded conflict gives a false sense of apartness making some 
conflicts seem irrelevant to societies at peace. The possibility of cruise missiles 
hitting peaceful countries caused huge peace marches; the snipers in Sarajevo did 
not. A third reason is that costs of violence continue to be underestimated because 
of inadequate estimates of the price of failed conflict prevention (Reychler 1999a).  
The last explanation concerns the state of peace research.  Despite a great 
deal of progress and creativity, the field remains hampered by three weaknesses 
(Reychler 1992, pp. 89-96). First, there is a lack of field experience or close 
cooperation between professionals in the field and peace researchers. A synergy 
between the speculari and operari (‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’) would enhance the peace 
building business considerably. Second, there is a one-dimensional quality of peace 
building; the negative side effects of many well-intentioned projects have been 
documented.1 Finally, there is a ‘toolbox approach’ to peace building. The result is 
that too many conflicted countries end up with piles of peace building stones, and 
no sustainable peace building.  
Despite all this, peace research is quickly reducing the gap with the green 
movement. The prevention of violent conflicts has become a major point on the 
agendas of foreign offices not only in the U.S. and in Europe, but also of major 
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU).2 The driving forces were not of moral or legal nature, but cost-benefit 
considerations. Once a conflict crosses the threshold of violence it becomes much 
more difficult and costly to manage it. Political, social, cultural, ecological, 
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psychological and spiritual costs join the already considerable costs of humanitarian 
suffering or economic destruction (Reychler 1999b). The human costs of failed 
conflict prevention or transitional aid are very high. The process of transition in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, had huge 
development costs, many of which are still unabated (UNDP 1999). Human costs 
refer to the loss of lives, the high levels of disease, poverty, socio-economic 
disparity, rising gender inequality, educational decline, unemployment and many 
less tangible costs. It has become clear that proactive conflict prevention (that is, 
efforts made before a conflict has escalated) is more cost effective than reactive 
conflict prevention (that is, efforts made after a conflict has become violent to 
contain and reduce the intensity, duration and the possibility of geographic spill 
over) (Brown and Rosecrance 1999). There is a growing perception that there are 
limits to the level of violence the world can permit. It has become clear that 
sustainable development is impossible without sustainable peace building. This 
paper tackles one of the challenges of the international community in this decade; 
namely, making the world safe from conflicts or creating a more effective system to 
prevent violence.   
 
Peace Architecture 
 
A major part of this challenge is the development of better peace 
architecture through more cost effective ways to create sustainable peace building 
processes. Strategists, designers and planners are also concerned with combining 
means and time efficiently. I found, for example, nearly one hundred peace plans 
drafted before the Second World War. There is a great deal of flexibility and 
overlapping in the meaning of the terms strategy, design, planning and architecture. 
The term strategy continues to be strongly associated with states or their alliances 
which are designed to focus on security, enemies and threats through the use of 
military force and command. The term peace plan is also quite restrictive. Most 
peace plans are legal blueprints for the creation of world peace or are too abstract in 
context. The term design has more appeal, but it is associated with the construction 
of conflict management systems or with business (for example, practice oriented 
towards the development of products, tools, components and processes) (Magolin 
and Buchanan, 1998).3   
I prefer to use the metaphor ‘peace architecture’ because (a) it draws 
attention to the architectural principles/considerations that have to be addressed in 
sustainable peace building processes; (b) it emphasizes the need to identify the 
necessary pre-conditions or building blocks for different types of conflicts; (c) it 
could shorten the learning curve by providing a methodology for comparative 
analysis and evaluation of conflict transformation; and (d) it could contribute to 
greater attention paid to the vital role of peace architects.  
 
Architectural Considerations and Principles 
 
The image of peace architecture suggests that peace building is not only a 
science but also an art, where imagination and creativity are an essential part of the 
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building process. This conveys the need for professional peace architects and 
architectural teams, and it draws attention to the key principles of the architecture 
process. Following are six principles that should guide the design of peace building 
processes.  
 
1. A clear and compelling definition of the peace to be built. This requires a 
reconciling of the competing needs of the owners and the concerns of the 
stakeholders who will have to share the same fate; imaging a more attractive future; 
and an estimation of the costs. 
2. A contextual and comprehensive assessment of the available peace 
building capacity with appreciative inquiry and of what still needs to be done to 
build a sustainable peace building process. 
3. The development of a coherent peace plan. Coherence refers to the 
achievement of good time management and of a synergy between peace building 
efforts in diverse domains, at different system-levels and layers of the conflict.  
 
Table 1: Coherence between Domains, Levels, Time-factors  
  and Layers of a Conflict 
 
            Levels/Actors 
-international -  global 
                      -  regional 
                      -  sub-regional 
-national        -  elite 
                      -  middle 
                      -  local 
 
    Domains/Measures 
                -diplomatic 
                -political 
                -economic 
                -humanitarian 
                -education 
                -information 
                -military 
    Time-factors 
   -timing of 
entry/exit 
 -lead time: long,    
middle, short 
 -synchronic or 
sequential 
 - duration 
           Layers 
-public layers 
        -public behavior/opinion
-deeper layers 
-private opinion, 
perceptions, wishes, 
expectations, feelings, 
emotions, historical 
memory 
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4. An effective implementation of the peace plan. This involves not only the 
commitment of sufficient time and means to build the sustainable peace process, but 
also coordination and effective leadership. 
5. The involvement/inclusion of the people who commissioned the peace 
building (the owners) and the stakeholders in the whole process. 
6. An identification and dismantling of the ‘senti-mental walls’4 that inhibit 
the peace building process.  
 
Building Blocks of Violence and Peace 
 
Another challenge of architectural analysis is the classification of different 
types of violence, peace and the identification of their causal antecedents or 
necessary preconditions. From a comparative study of the architecture of the 
genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda and Burundi, seven building blocks of genocide were 
distilled (Reychler 2000): 
 
Table 2. Building Blocks of Genocide 
 
• A country in transition with high levels of political, economic and cultural 
insecurity and frustration. 
• An authoritarian government that attributes the responsibility of the 
problems to a particular group. 
• A small group of fanatical leaders and a pliable majority. 
• A systematic dehumanization of the victimized group(s). 
• A plan for ethnic cleansing. 
• A relatively powerless victimized group. 
• An international community that disapproves morally of the genocidal 
behavior, but does not take effective measures to prevent or stop the 
massacres. 
 
Table 3: Building Blocks of Sustainable Peace Building 
 
• An effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation at 
different levels. 
• Political and economic peace enhancing structures (consolidated democracy 
and social free market system). 
• An objective and subjective security system. 
• An integrative moral political climate, characterized by the expectation of 
an attractive future resulting from cooperation, a replacement of exclusive 
nationalism with multiple loyalties, reconciliation and dismantlement of 
senti-mental walls. 
• Political, economic and security cooperation at a multilateral level. 
• A critical mass of internal and external peace building leadership.   
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Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of Peace Architectures 
 
Another challenge of architectural research is the development of ways and 
means to improve sustainable peace building processes. A comparative analysis and 
evaluation of successful and less successful peace building efforts could shorten the 
learning curve significantly. In such a comparative study, three phases could be 
distinguished. In the first phase an analysis and evaluation is made of the conflict to 
be transformed. This gives an indication of the problems to be solved and the degree 
of difficulty to be expected. The second phase involves an assessment of the results 
or the output of the peace building efforts, while the third phase focuses on the 
process.  
 
Phase 1: Analysis and Evaluation of the Conflict to Be Transformed 
 
In this part a diagnosis would be made of the actors, the issues, the 
opportunity structure, the strategic approaches of the parties involved and of the 
conflict dynamics. This gives us an idea of the type of conflict one is confronted 
with, and also allows us to estimate the costs and difficulty of the conflict 
transformation efforts. The latter implies additional data gathering and analysis of 
the peace building efforts, such as: the actors included or excluded in the peace 
process (levels/internal-external); the prescriptive or indicative nature of the 
process; the operational definition of peace; the issues addressed; the tools selected; 
the levels on which the peace efforts were focused; the layers of the conflict 
addressed; the time management; the commitment of time and means and the 
coordination of efforts. 
            
Phase 2: Evaluation of the Outcomes/Results of the Peace Building Efforts 
 
Here we focus on two criteria of effectiveness: the nature of the outcome 
and the durability. The nature of the outcome is assessed by checking how and to 
what extent the above-mentioned criteria of sustainable peace are satisfied. The 
durability is assessed by studying the installation and consolidation of the necessary 
preconditions of sustainable peace.  
 
Phase 3: Evaluation of the Peace Building Process 
 
This is the most difficult part of the comparative study because it requires a 
thorough understanding of what is needed to build an effective, efficient and 
satisfactory peace building process. In the second phase, the effectiveness was 
assessed by looking at the nature of the outcome and the durability. To assess the 
efficiency one uses direct and indirect sets of measures. The first set of direct 
measures assesses the tangible and intangible costs of the transition such as the 
human, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ecological, political and spiritual 
costs; the amount of time wasted and missed opportunities and the impact of the 
transition on the nature of the relations between the conflicting parties.  
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Table 4. Evaluation of Peace Building Architecture 
 
Criteria Measurement 
Effectiveness Nature of outcome: characteristics sustainable peace 
Durability: installation and consolidation of building blocks 
Efficiency  Direct measures: costs/time/relations 
Indirect measures of factors that are assumed to enhance 
efficiency, such as inclusiveness of the process, early 
warning of threats and opportunities, effective negotiation 
and mediation efforts, etc.   
Satisfaction  With the process 
With the relationship 
With the outcome 
 
 
The second set of indirect measures studies the series of factors that tend to 
enhance or inhibit transition processes. The efficiency of the peace building process 
influences several variables below. 
 
The involvement of the people who view themselves as deeply affected by 
the peace building process. The inclusion or exclusion of the owners and 
stakeholders makes the difference between failure and success. The people who see 
their interest as deeply affected should be at the heart of the decision making 
process. Others who should be included, consulted or informed are: those who could 
hinder the successful implementation; those whose advise or assistance is needed; 
and those whose approval will be required to enable the project to proceed 
(Kraybill, 1995).  
Effective communication, consultation, negotiation and mediation process. 
This implies an evocative rather than a prescriptive approach and an acquaintance 
with effective negotiation and mediation methods that tend to enhance win-win 
agreements with low transaction costs, good relations and durable outcomes. 
A contextual and comprehensive analysis of the problems which are 
responsible for the conflict.5 Special attention should be directed to the components 
of sustainable peace that need to be absent, installed or consolidated. 
An appreciative inquiry of the strengths and the peace potential in the 
conflict ridden zone. In contrast to the problem-oriented approach — which focuses 
on the past, the problems, and the weaknesses — an appreciative inquiry turns the 
attention to the future and the strengths on which peace could be built.  
A clear and compelling definition of peace. The conflict behavior of the 
parties is strongly influenced by their respective expectations about the future. 
Therefore, the projection of a clear and attractive future could catalyze the conflict 
transition process significantly. Peace architects such as Jean Monnet, succeeded in 
convincing the Europeans that cooperation would bring them not only security, but 
also freedom and affluence. In other cases, the parties will have to negotiate a better 
future by reconciling competing values. 
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The battery of tools used in the conflict transformation process. (For 
example, European Community). These tools should be related to the specific peace 
building needs in the conflict zone.    
The coherence of the peace building plan. Here we look at the synergy or 
the interaction of actions such that the total effect is greater than the sum of the 
individual effects. Attention is paid to the cross impact of the efforts in different 
domains (political, diplomatic, military, humanitarian, economic, etc.); at different 
levels (internal and external – elite/middle/local); on different layers (public 
behavior, opinions, perceptions, feelings) and time-factors. The purpose is to 
enhance the positive and synergetic impact of the peace building efforts and prevent 
and/or reduce the negative effects (Reychler 1999c, 144-162). The installation of an 
effective conflict impact assessment system (CIAS) would help considerably (Davis 
1996; Gardner 1993).  
The use of time. Time is one of the vital and nonrenewable resources that 
continue to be wasted. Time is money, but it also makes the difference between life 
and death. Many violent conflicts are examples of missed opportunities. More 
research should be undertaken about the role of time and timing in conflict 
transformation. On the agenda are issues such as: attitudes towards time (proactive 
versus reactive); the relative importance paid to the past, present and future in the 
design of a reconciliation process, (for example; the lead-time of projects); the 
preference of short-, middle- and long-term programs; the duration of the 
intervention; when to enter and exit; how to schedule the interventions 
(consequentially or simultaneously).  
Other questions should be considered, including: Can elections be 
organized when there is no agreement about power-sharing? Is there something like 
an economic threshold below which efforts for democratization are a waste of time?  
How should political democratization and economic privatization be linked? 
Intelligent early warning. An intelligent early warning system tries not only 
to anticipate threats and the risk of violent escalation, but also pays attention to the 
opportunities to intervene proactively; to the costs of different conflict 
transformation policies and the impact of planned policies, and programs or projects 
about the dynamics of the conflict. The development and installation of an effective 
conflict impact assessment system would increase the chances of a conflict 
prevention system considerably. 
Effective implementation of a peace building plan. This implies not only the 
commitment of sufficient time and means but also leadership and a good 
coordination of the peace building activities of the parties involved.  
Unlearning and dismantling of ‘senti-mental walls’. Peace building is not 
only about construction, but also about deconstruction. To analyze and transform 
conflicts, more attention needs to be paid to political-psychological variables. In 
particular, efforts should be made to identify and dismantle ‘senti-mental walls’. 
This term refers to concepts, theories, dogmas, attitudes, habits, emotions and 
inclinations that inhibit democratic transition and constructive transformation of 
conflicts. The existence of senti-mental walls increases the chances of 
misperceiving the situation and of misevaluating the interests at stake; they lower 
the motivation to act on an opportunity and hinder the development of the necessary 
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skills and know-how to overcome conflicts. The hyphenation of sentiment and 
mental to ‘senti-mental’ is done to make people aware of the emotional roots. In a 
comparative study of genocide, it became clear that the behavior of all actors was 
distorted: the victims by despair, pluralistic ignorance and political inefficacy; the 
offenders by historical falsification, stereotyping, dehumanization, distrust and 
indifference; the third parties by neutralism/passivity/non-intervention, cultural 
arrogance, moral-legal approach and the preference to wait until the conflict is 
‘ripe’; the analysts by one-dimensional analysis, the use of invalid theories, pseudo-
scientific doctrines/myths/taboos, elitist analysis, wrong assessment of future 
developments, etc. 
A critical mass of peace building leadership. Without a critical mass of 
external and internal leadership, who motivates, guides and commits people to the 
peace building process, the chances of successful peace building are very low. 
Could a leader make a difference in bringing people together? Do unfortunate 
countries lack leadership or is the level of conflict sometimes too powerful for any 
leader to overcome (Lederach 1997)? The premise is that an essential ingredient of 
sustainable peace building is a critical mass of leadership that can raise hope, 
generate ways and means to reach the goals, and commit people to the peace 
building process. The critical mass of leadership needed depends on the specific 
conflict context. It could include internal and external leadership; some conflicts can 
be transformed successfully with internal leadership, others necessitate external 
leadership to support the process. 
The internal leadership to be involved could be situated at different levels. 
The top level comprises the key political and military leaders in the conflict 
(Monnet 1976). These people are the highest representative leaders of the 
government and opposition movements or present themselves as such. The middle 
range leadership is not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority or 
structures of the formal or major opposition movements. They could be highly 
respected individuals or persons who occupy formal positions of leadership in 
sectors such as education, business, religion, agriculture, health or humanitarian 
organizations. The grassroots leadership includes people who are involved in local 
communities, members of indigenous non-governmental organizations carrying out 
relief projects for local populations, health officials and refugee camp leaders. 
 
Process 
 
The overall aim is to create a win-win situation or a mutually benefiting 
sense of interdependence between all the parties involved and to embed the peace 
building into institutions that reinforce and sustain the process. Jean Monnet 
stressed repeatedly the importance of helping the Europeans to see their common 
interests (leur intérêt commun). He also pleaded for the creation of ‘supranational’ 
institutions (such as the European commission), which could facilitate the 
cooperation process (Kraybill 1995).  Sustainable peace is seen (a) as the result of a 
reconciliation of competing values, interests and needs, such as freedom, justice, 
affluence, security, truth, mercy and dignity, and (b) as flourishing best in a 
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consolidated democratic environment. A great deal of effort is spent on the 
development of a good process (Bennis and Nanus 1985, p. 224).  
The process is inclusive. Monnet insisted on talking to all participants 
(government, business, unions, etc.) to engage all the stakeholders in the peace 
building process. The assumption is that parties to a conflict will work more 
effectively at a resolution if they have personal stakes in the successful outcome of 
the process (Global Excellence Management 1999).  
There is the belief that nothing positive can be expected from a peace plan 
build on unequal grounds rules. Monnet insisted on negotiating on the basis of 
equality and did not accept the idea of primus inter pares.  
In order to build confidence, the process is made transparent. All plans 
Monnet proposed were clear and simple. He believed trust could be achieved by 
presenting unambiguous plans that would substantiate the peace process through 
mutually beneficial goals. When initially some negotiators were suspicious, little by 
little, they saw that there was nothing to hide.   
The problem solving approach is enriched with an appreciative inquiry 
(Monnet 1976, p. 273). Appreciative inquiry is a far more complex process than the 
simple positive thinking approach with which it is sometimes confused. It involves 
challenging the status quo by envisioning a preferred future and identifying the 
existing peace building potential. Both the identification of the strengths and the 
articulation of a realistic and attractive future, a condition that is in some important 
ways better than what now exist, can accelerate the conflict transformation 
considerably.       
Another characteristic of peace builders is their proactive mindset. Monet 
was a mover, not a care-taker. He not only envisioned a European Union, but he 
also tried to assess the impact of policy alternatives proactively.  
Characteristic is the open-minded search for alternative means to build 
peace in an efficient way. Peace builders are not orators who instinctively know the 
solution. Peace builders make a distinction between interests and positions and 
search actively for formulas that satisfy all conflicting parties. In some cases, this 
could mean integrative solutions (such as the creation of a European Union, the new 
South Africa or the unification of East and West Germany) or a disintegrative 
solution, such as the relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Empire or the 
smooth divorce of the Slovak and Czech people. A great deal of time is taken out to 
search for and develop alternative solutions.       
Decisions are not made on the basis of pressures or emotions, but on their 
merit. Essential is the use of fair and objective standards and procedures for 
evaluating alternative policy options. To convey the costs and benefits of alternative 
futures Monnet made ample use of balance sheets.    
It is important to engage and network with the leaders of different domains 
and at different levels in the process. Monnet did not perform as a prima donna, but 
preferred to give the limelight to the politicians: “Since they take the risks, they 
should have the laurels” (Europa Notities 1996, p. 400).6    
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Conclusion 
 
To research more systematically the characteristics of peace architects such 
as Jean Monnet would significantly contribute to more effective peace building. It 
would not only help to identify and strengthen the peace building potential, but also 
to track and weaken the spoilers in the peace building process. It could also 
eliminate some of the stereotypical images of peace builders, such as the image of 
passive pacifists. They do not only construct, but also need to deconstruct. They cut 
through dogmas, taboos, doctrines, etiquette, cynicism and others sentimental 
obstacles on the way to progress. Monnet challenged the ideas of political prestige 
and economic protectionism; he pleaded for supra-nationalism and questioned the 
belief in ‘archenemies’ or the existence of a politically independent economic 
sphere. He was a professional with a cause. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Since the publication of Mary Anderson’s, Do No Harm: Supporting Capacities 
for Peace through Aid, many studies have highlighted the negative impact of uni-
dimensional well-intentioned efforts (humanitarian and structural aid, peace 
keeping, democratization, etc) on the peace building process. The work done by 
Peter Uvin has been remarkable.  
 
2. For the European Union, see for example Conflict Prevention Network (1999).   
 
3. See also K. Slaikeu and R. H. Hasson (1998); C. A. Constantino and C. S. 
Merchant (1996); and W. L. Ury, J. M. Breet and S. Goldberg (1988). 
 
4. See page 31 for a description of ‘senti-mental walls’. 
 
5. A useful typology of impact can be found in M. A. Max-Neef (1991). He 
distinguishes destroying – impact, pseudo-impact, inhibiting impact, singular 
impact, synergic impact and exogenous and endogenous impacts. 
 
6. See also M. Kohnstamm (1981) and Jean Monnet (1976). 
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 When we speak of the role of faith in cross-cultural conflict resolution, our 
challenge is to honor the diversity of the world’s humanistic and spiritual traditions 
while seeking common ground among them. What we aspire towards, in other 
words, is an agenda for research, dialogue and activism that is global in conception 
and responsive to common challenges of peacemaking and coexistence within and 
among the world’s many traditions. It is no longer sufficient for transnational peace 
agendas to be defined primarily by the cultural experiences and perceived security 
threats of a particular nation or culture. We need new frameworks for organizing 
knowledge about religion, culture and spirituality – frameworks that recognize the 
powerful role that faith and belief play in conflict and conflict resolution, and that 
do not privilege one culture as ‘normal’ and label another as ‘exceptional’. 
 One of the greatest barriers to open dialogue between major cultural traditions 
is the assumption that a universally valid (and presumably secular) framework of 
knowledge for peace and the resolution of conflicts already exists. This notion is 
untenable for two reasons. First, it breeds complacency, lack of vision and reliance 
on dominant paradigms which presuppose that peace and human development ‘take 
care of themselves’ so long as self-interested actors pursue such mundane, 
minimalist goals as economic growth and physical security.  
 Second, it is exclusive, and implies that approaches based on non-Western 
sources, or even religious precepts, for that matter, are dangerous or somehow 
invalid (Dallmayr 2000). The rising prominence of protracted ethnic and religious 
conflicts, however, has convinced many scholars that the cultural and religious 
aspects of conflict and its resolution must be taken seriously. An emerging literature 
on religion, conflict resolution and peace has contributed significantly to this 
development. 
 One of the most important findings of cross-cultural conflict resolution research 
is that religion is a perennial and perhaps inevitable factor in both conflict and 
conflict resolution. Religion, after all, is a powerful constituent of cultural norms 
and values, and because it addresses the most profound existential issues of human 
life (e.g., freedom and inevitability, fear and faith, security and insecurity, right and 
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wrong, sacred and profane), religion is deeply implicated in individual and social 
conceptions of peace. To transform the conflicts besetting the world today, we need 
to uncover the conceptions of peace within our diverse religious and cultural 
traditions, while seeking the common ground among them. 
 
Defining the Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacemaking 
 
 Peace and conflict resolution are both universal and particular; similar as well 
as divergent approaches derive form and vitality from the cultural resources of a 
people. When we examine peacemaking and conflict resolution across cultures, we 
discover both common themes and significant differences, both of which enhance 
our general theories of conflict resolution and help to create constructive channels 
for the perennial religious impulse. 
 Whether or not scholars and practitioners are consciously aware of religious 
influences in the shaping of their own perceptions, religious belief systems directly 
impact the development of theories of conflict and conflict resolution. Primarily, 
this occurs through presuppositions regarding the nature of reality and society, the 
purpose and ultimate meaning of life, and the means by which to live an ‘authentic’ 
ideal life – the life of inner and outer peace. Religious concepts of peace, then, 
embody and elaborate upon the highest moral and ethical principles of a given 
society and define the terms and conditions for individual and social harmony.   
 Religion may be defined as a path of ultimate transformation, comprised of 
interconnected systems of symbols and guidelines. These shape the individual and 
group subconscious from which social practices and interactions are all given 
meaning (Galtung 1997). This common frame of reference underpins the very fabric 
of group and individual identity, providing the shared normative foundation that 
makes harmonious social interaction possible as well as meaningful. Social and 
political norms manifest the virtues, priorities and ideals of their religious culture.  
 
Religion in Conflict Situations 
 
 In promulgating the ideals and values held in highest esteem by groups and 
individuals, religion profoundly influences goal-seeking behavior in conflict 
situations, by establishing the criteria or frames of reference for determining the 
rightness and wrongness of events. Viewed from a religious perspective, conflicts 
are interpreted not only as ruptures in horizontal relationships between human 
beings, but also as ruptures in one’s vertical relationship with the divine. 
 The ‘shared cultural universe’ or ‘collective cosmology’ that religion provides 
operates at both a conscious and subconscious level, and both levels come into play 
in the midst of conflict. For disputants, the disruption that accompanies conflict can 
shake unstated, implicit expectations and reinforce tendencies to frame relationships 
in terms of religious categories. In this context, religious presuppositions regarding 
‘self’, ‘other’, ‘conflict’ and ‘peace’ emerge, as individuals or groups frame the 
conflict, give it meaning and fashion responses appropriate to their values and goals 
for its resolution. 
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 By enjoining a broad repertoire of models or precedents of desirable behavior in 
conflicted circumstances while specifically admonishing others, religion implicitly 
influences the desirability and likelihood of certain courses of action over others. 
When utilized constructively, religion can affect individual and social responses to 
triggering events through (a) placing the event in a historical, goal-seeking context, 
(b) providing meaning for events in light of values, goals and religious identity and 
(c) offering roles for dealing with conflict through appropriate, affirmative 
responses based on religious precepts and idealized models or precedents. When 
faced with difficult challenges or uncertainty in conflicts, participants rely on these 
established codes of conduct to alleviate cognitive dissonance, anxiety and guilt as 
well as to fashion a path of correctness (based on idealized courses of action) that 
promises to restore harmony and order. 
 
Religion and Conflict Resolution 
 
 It is essential to recognize that the experience of conflict evokes a deep-seated 
need for affirmation of identity and restoration of meaning. Conflict resolution does 
more than address material clashes of interest; it speaks to social reintegration, 
restoration and redemption, existential security, personal transcendence and 
transformation. These concepts are drawn from the backdrop of the sacred, which 
may be defined as any process that explicitly connects us to the largest possible 
context to which we belong (Said, Lerche and Lerche 1995; see also Bateson and 
Bateson 1987). The affirmation of individual and group identity achieved through 
redemptive transformation is essential in giving meaning to a conflict and its 
resolution. Attempts to divorce the spiritual from conflict resolution practices deny 
an essential component of healing and social restoration that permits conflicts to be 
experienced as resolved. 
 The religious cosmology of a group, in privileging some values and ideals over 
others, specifies how restoration, wholeness and healing can be achieved through 
distinctive paths of resolution adopted by different cultures (Abu-Nimer 1996). 
Conflict resolution approaches that do not incorporate appropriate and relevant 
paths of redemptive transformation are less likely to yield more enduring or 
effective resolution. The ruptures experienced in conflict situations often require 
symbolic or other social exchange found within collective cosmologies. In this way, 
conflict resolution strategies manifest distinctive conceptions of peace, which 
illuminate the terms and conditions necessary for social harmony to be both 
understood and experienced.  
 For example, in Christian cosmologies and in some Western approaches to 
conflict resolution, personal responses such as an aspiration toward transcendence 
or perceptual transformation are encouraged, emphasizing historical breaks from the 
past that enable renewal and revisionism. This is in line with Christianity’s 
traditional emphasis on a personal relationship with the divine and the idealized 
social value attached to the individual pursuit of interests (Tarnas 1991). 
Significantly, Christianity alone among the monotheist traditions encourages this 
kind of comprehensive, unilateral conflict resolution approach, whereas in both 
Islam and Judaism, reciprocal or other social actions signal the achievement of 
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resolution within a larger, historical context. The role of community and community 
leaders in achieving historically and communally acceptable solutions is particularly 
evident in Islamic approaches to conflict resolution. 
 
Islam, Peace  and Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution:  
A Comparative Perspective 
 
 Contemporary frictions between Western and Muslim societies underscore the 
importance of developing cross-cultural frameworks that highlight inter-religious 
and faith-based dimensions of conflict resolution. Where poorly managed conflict 
leads to distortion and failure of communication, cooperative inquiry into traditions 
of peace and peacemaking helps to establish new points of contact and 
complementarity across cultures. 
 For far too long, Western media and scholarship have tended to mirror the 
unfortunate estrangement between Islamic and Western societies and cultures. 
Popular as well as academic literatures have focused disproportionately on religious 
radicalism and militancy, effectively viewing Islam through the lenses of terrorism 
and violence and neglecting its role as a deeply embedded discourse and affirmative 
value system in the day-to-day lives of Muslims. Meanwhile, early Muslim 
admiration for the West’s achievements has been tempered by a tendency to filter 
perceptions through the lenses of colonialism, imperialism and contemporary 
grievances in the Middle East. 
 To this day, the presumption of incompatibility has provided the dominant 
motif for storytelling about Islamic and Western cultures. Both Western observers 
and Muslims paint with broad brushstrokes when they engage in generalization 
about macro-cultural units of analysis, and fail to account for the diverse strands of 
cultural legacies. As protagonists of the story of incompatibility, they often resort to 
a language of exclusivity. This language is preoccupied with defining boundaries, 
and manifests a retreat from intercultural experiences to psychological and cultural 
segregation. Implicitly or explicitly, the ‘other’ is depicted as a threatening 
monolith.1 The result is that Muslim and Western analysts have placed such strong 
emphasis on extremist tendencies among their purported adversaries that a ‘clash of 
symbols’ has begun to emerge, in which the most superficial and eye-catching 
aspects of the ‘other’ are highlighted at the expense of shared and convergent 
values. 
 To transcend the ‘clash of symbols’, Muslims and Westerners must aspire to 
know one another within a new context of sustained, dialogical engagement. 
Dialogue can enable Muslims to respond more substantively to the innovations of 
the West, while also making it possible for Westerners to appreciate Islamic 
conceptions of peace and thereby transcend the habit of focusing narrowly on those 
groups of Muslims that are responsible for destructive acts or confrontational 
rhetoric. 
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Contrasting Western and Islamic Approaches to Peace 
 
 Although Western approaches to peace reflect traditions within Christian 
religious cosmology, most are underpinned by largely secular intellectual 
constructs. In the field of international relations, the prevailing Western approach is 
apparent in an emergent synthesis of neorealist power politics and neoliberal 
institutionalism. Considered separately from justice, peace is equated with an 
absence of war; justice, in turn, is understood as an absence of gross violations of 
human rights. As an absence of war or organized violence, peace is maintained by 
the threat of coercion and by institutionalized cooperation among great powers. 
Peace is equated with stability and order guaranteed by hegemonic influence. Where 
institutionalized order cannot be guaranteed, as in politics among core and 
peripheral nation-states, preponderance of coercive power is viewed as a necessary, 
albeit arbitrary, arbiter of intractable disputes. 
 In its defense of the contemporary world order, the dominant approach to peace 
in international relations reflects the modern Western tendency to think about peace 
and conflict resolution in terms of rational order or problem solving predicated upon 
reason and expediency. Following the example of such Greek thinkers as Plato and 
Euripides, modern Western thinking regards reason as sacred. Passion has been 
posited as the opponent of reason (hence the putatively dispassionate quality of 
serious intellectual inquiry); passion is dangerous and destructive. Emmanuel Kant 
(1723-1804), for example, understood history as progress toward rationality (Reiss 
1991).2 While it is true that modern advocates of realpolitik have disregarded Kant’s 
optimistic rationalism, they have not rejected the underlying assumption that peace 
can only reign if reason continues to achieve triumphal victories in an ongoing war 
against passion – for example, against tribalism, ethnic conflict and ideologically 
based competition. In the past, Islamic civilization has sometimes been framed as 
inimical to this Western ethos, and as an ‘exception’ to natural processes of 
development and progressive, peaceful change. 
 Not surprisingly, the conception of peace that is dominant among Western elites 
differs markedly from Islamic conceptions. Historically, Islamic thinkers benefited 
from and even extended the thought of the Greeks, but speculative thought never 
dissociated itself from religious precepts and values. Moreover, most Muslim 
thinkers were reluctant to imitate the Greek inclination to sanctify reason while 
denigrating passion. Reason was seldom regarded as sacred in its own right, nor was 
passion viewed solely as a source of disruption and injustice. The general tendency 
was to view reason and passion as complementary aspects of the human being that 
can be integrated through the faith and practice of Islam, active submission to the 
divine.  Such an integration is suggested by the Qur’anic ideal of nafs 
al-mutma’inna, the “soul at peace” (Qur’an, 89:27), in which deeply held values, 
conscience, and desire are in harmony.3 
 Like Christians, Jews and followers of other traditions, Muslims share in a 
common calling to work for peace. This calling is rooted in the Qur’an, which 
enjoins humanity to “strive as in a race in all virtues” (Qur’an, 5:48). Within the 
Muslim community, or umma, this calling has manifested, and will no doubt 
continue to manifest, in varied ways that reflect continuous efforts to interpret and 
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apply foundational Islamic values in specific historical, social and cultural 
situations. Islam, like all religions, is not only a theological affirmation but also a 
living historical process with multiple syntheses and expressions that must be taken 
into account. Though in principle we may speak of Islam as an integral tradition, 
from a practical, realistic standpoint there are many Islams, each of which reflects a 
different approach to perennial challenges of integrating precept and practice. 
Through its varied traditions, Islam has much to contribute to intercultural and inter-
religious dialogue on the advancement of peace and related humanistic and spiritual 
values (Said, Funk and Kadayifci 2001). 
 Practices of Islamic societies, of course, have often reflected those aspects of 
the prevailing Western approach to peace that call for coercive power, particularly 
through an emphasis on the role of centralized authority in checking centrifugal 
forces of rebellion and fragmentation. Nonetheless, Islamic norms have long 
rendered a minimalist approach to issues of peace and justice questionable in its 
religious legitimacy. Ever since Muslims first assembled themselves in political 
community, they have believed that a society guided by inspired laws, wise 
leadership and extensive consultation is superior to a society governed by the 
arbitrary whims of a king, dictator or oligarchy. Islam puts little faith in ideas such 
as the ‘invisible hand’, and enjoins the proactive establishment of peace through a 
just social order. Peace is understood to imply not only an absence of oppression 
and tumult, but also a presence of justice and conditions for human flourishing. 
 As Muslim jurists developed the shari’a, or law of Islam, they responded both 
to the demands of governing a new empire, and to the abuse of power by caliphal 
authority. Many shari’a provisions, such as the rules of evidence, were understood 
as a protective code, ensuring that believers would be able to pursue the good life 
(hayy tayyiba) without fear. While Muslim thinkers have given consideration to the 
same types of dilemmas that have preoccupied Hobbes and Locke, Islamic 
aspirations have long reflected a broad and holistic conception of peace.4 This 
conception is premised on the Qur’an and Sunnah (the example of the Prophet). 
 The keynote of the Qur’anic revelation could be characterized as integration and 
wholeness through surrender to God. This essential theme is expressed in a 
universalistic spirit, suggesting a worldview premised on tolerance and 
inclusiveness (Qur’an, 49:13). Peace in Islam begins with God; God is peace, for 
peace (al-Salam) is one of the “most beautiful names” of God (Qur’an, 59:23-24). 
Peace in the world reflects higher realities. In the Qur’an, peace is affirmed as the 
greeting, language, and condition of Paradise (Qur’an, 10:10, 14:23, 19:61-63, 
36:58). God calls believers unto the abode of peace (dar al-salam) (Qur’an, 10:25), 
and the yearning for peace derives from the innermost nature of humankind. 
Interestingly enough, the word Islam derives not from the name of a particular 
prophet or people, but from the same root as salam (s-l-m) and suggests a condition 
of peace, security, wholeness and safety from harm that is attained through 
surrender (taslim) to the Divine. 
 Peace, then, occupies a central position among Islamic precepts, where it is 
closely linked to justice and human flourishing. Peace in Islam suggests a condition 
of principle-based order – a proper equilibrium of parts – from which a pattern of 
harmony can emerge. This condition is both internal and external; upholding it is 
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the responsibility of every Muslim. The term jihad, often translated superficially as 
“holy war”, actually means striving, and the “greater jihad” (al-jihad al-akbar) in 
the Islamic tradition has always been the inner struggle to purify the self and behave 
in a manner which furthers rather than disrupts the divine harmony. 
 Islam adopts a positive view of human nature, insisting that the original human 
constitution (fitrah) is good and muslim in character. There is no conception of 
original sin, but rather a hopeful conception of human potential that is integrally 
related to a status of stewardship towards creation. In contrast to the Western idea of 
free choice and freedom from constraint (‘freedom to do’), Islam accentuates 
existential freedom (‘freedom to be’). The dignity of the individual is actualized 
through service, within a broader context of human solidarity. 
 There is a clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence over violence, 
and for forgiveness (‘afu) over retribution. The Qur’an aims to regulate the 
commonplace, retributive responses of people to conflict and violence. Forgiveness 
is consistently held out as the preferred option for humanity in matters of requiting 
clear injustice or crime. “The recompense of an injury is an injury the like thereof; 
but whoever forgives and thereby brings about a reestablishment of harmony, his 
reward is with God; and God loves not the wrongdoers” (Qur’an, 42:40). Neither 
naive pardon nor a mechanical retribution is urged; what is sought is a reformation 
or moral good accomplished by sincere forgiveness. 
 Finally, the Qur’an frequently cautions people against going to excess when 
attempting to pursue rights or correct injustice. The Qur’an discourages 
unnecessary conflict, and heaps utter condemnation on those who, by selfishly 
pursuing their own limited goals, bring destruction, oppression and violence (fitnah) 
down upon the rest of their fellows, “committing excesses on earth” (Qur’an, 5:33).  
 
A Communally Embedded Approach to Conflict Resolution 
 
 From an Islamic point of view, the achievements of the dominant Western 
approach to peace are impressive, but also one-sided. From a Muslim perspective, 
the Western approach puts too much faith in institutional formulas and the 
“invisible hand” of competition, and too little emphasis on communal cooperation 
in the conscious pursuit of values. Where the Western approach celebrates human 
self-determination, the Islamic perspective underscores divine purpose and human 
exertion. While the Western approach points to political pluralism, individual rights 
and consumerism as the substance of peace, the Islamic perspective affirms cultural 
pluralism, communal solidarity, social justice and faith. 
 The differences between Western and Islamic approaches to conflict resolution 
mirror some of the differences between Western and Islamic perspectives on peace. 
Modern Western traditions view conflict as natural and potentially even creative (in 
ideas ranging from ‘natural selection’ and ‘creative destruction’ to ‘nonviolent 
conflict transformation’), despite its potential conduciveness to instability and 
disorder. While professionals and scholars who specialize in conflict resolution 
abjure attempts to merely suppress conflict and encourage the brokering of durable, 
mutually beneficial resolutions to problems (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991), the 
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prevailing inclination is to permit open confrontation among conflicting interests 
without necessarily seeking a ‘win-win’ solution or recourse to religious values. 
 While conflict resolution specialists have begun to develop newer approaches in 
order to prioritize human needs and non-adversarial processes (Burton 1990; Laue 
1988), Western conflict resolution has traditionally reflected a cultural outlook of 
pragmatic individualism and a style of instrumental problem-solving (Scimecca 
1991). This outlook has been associated with an emphasis on expediency and 
technique. From an Islamic standpoint, it can be criticized as an engineering 
approach that neglects relationships while focusing on isolated issues or on 
variables that can be manipulated mechanistically.  
 However suitable modern Western techniques may be in their original cultural 
milieu – especially when harmonized with religious or humanistic values – their 
applications in more traditional or non-Western contexts are circumscribed. John 
Paul Lederach (1995), for example, has observed substantial differences between 
contemporary Western conflict resolution approaches and traditional Latin 
American approaches that are derived from indigenous culture and embedded in 
communal realities. On the basis of his work in the region, Lederach (1995) 
concludes that ‘insider partial’ mediators – who are by definition well versed in 
local cultural meanings and expectations, and often have vested interests in conflict 
outcomes – have better chances of making important contributions than mediators 
who play the North American role of the disinterested, impartial outsider (see also 
Wehr and Lederach 1993). Other scholars have also recognized the role that culture 
plays in conflict and peacemaking, and have affirmed the potential contributions of 
diverse religious institutions and principles to conflict resolution within divided 
societies (Augsburger 1992; Avruch 1998). 
 While the strongest current of the Western approach to conflict resolution 
prioritizes problems to be abstracted and solved, distinctively Islamic approaches 
resemble other non-Western approaches insofar as they frame conflicts as matters of 
communal and not just individual concern, and underscore the importance of 
repairing and maintaining social relationships. Muslim approaches to conflict 
resolution draw on religious values, social networks, rituals of reconciliation (Irani 
and Funk 1998) and historical practices of communal and inter-communal 
coexistence. Strong emphasis is placed on linkages between personal and group 
identity, between individual and collective responsibility for wrongdoings, and 
between attentiveness to ‘face’-related issues (public status, shame, reputation for 
generosity) and the achievement of restorative justice within a context of continuing 
relationship. Conflict resolution efforts are directed toward the maintenance of 
communal or intercommunal harmony. They favor recognition of mutual rights and 
obligations, and uphold shared values by calling for public apology, compensation 
for losses and forgiveness (Irani and Funk 1998). Conflict resolution mechanisms 
are legitimized and guaranteed by communal leaders and (traditionally) elders who 
facilitate a process of reconciliation. History is regarded as a source of stability and 
guidance that provides lessons for shaping a common future for the society. Efforts 
aim to protect and empower families and the community as a whole to participate in 
a resolution process. 
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Islam and the West:  A Search for Common Ground 
 
 Discussion of Islamic conceptions of peace and conflict resolution leads quite 
naturally to the question of Islamic political activism. Contemporary Islamic 
activism is best understood not as a backward-looking rejection of the modern 
world, but rather as a deeply felt expression of cultural identity and a critique of 
domestic as well as international political orders (Falk 1997; Salla 1997).5 Islam 
provides its adherents with a language that addresses all aspects of life, and Islamic 
activism equips Muslims with a vocabulary through which they may affirm their 
identity and project themselves politically. 
 One distinction that many observers of Islam fail to make concerns the 
difference between revivalism and fundamentalism.  Islamic revivalism is a broad-
based social and political movement directed toward internal renewal. First and 
foremost, it is a response to a widely felt malaise that has left Muslim societies 
weak and unable to meet the modern world on their own terms. Although its 
manifestations are remarkably widespread, Islamic revivalism is not a monolithic 
movement, nor is it equivalent to the militant fundamentalism – a reaction to foreign 
incursions and perceived threats to identity and security – that captures the attention 
of the media.  Among the world’s major historical powers, only the Muslims, as a 
people, have not reversed the decline in their global status. The Japanese, the 
Chinese and the Europeans have all regained their world influence. The Islamic 
revival is a way that Muslims are defining who they are. Under conditions of 
cultural, economic and political marginalization, large numbers of people are 
returning to deeply embedded religious discourses as they search for authentic 
values and alternative means of responding to their problems. 
 All too often, differences between Islamic and Western concepts and values are 
either over-represented or under-represented. When they are over-represented, the 
result is the traditional ‘incompatibility’ story, in which dialogue between the West 
and Islam is portrayed as an exercise in futility. In large part to counteract this story, 
a second story – the story of compatibility – has also been told, identifying genuine 
similarities but sometimes seeking to subsume Islamic precepts within a Western 
framework. A third story – a story of intercultural complementarity and 
reconciliation, we hope – has yet to be written. Nonetheless, we would like to 
suggest a possible script for this new narrative. 
 Because Islamic traditions provide a set of powerful political precepts and 
practices with universal implications, Islam can make important contributions to an 
integrated world order that affirms the unique value of all cultural traditions. In 
particular, Islam prescribes a strong sense of community and solidarity of people: it 
postulates a collaborative concept of freedom; and it demystifies the Western myth 
of triumphant material progress and development. Moreover, Islamic precepts offer 
strongly affirmative statements on the subject of cultural pluralism. 
 In the Western pluralistic tradition, diversity is seen in terms of the coexistence 
of political systems and ideas but not of cultures. Cultural pluralism has roots in an 
Islamic tradition of ethnic diversity that historically fostered a tendency toward 
cultural broadness and flexibility. This heritage has allowed autonomous 
non-Muslim cultures to flourish within Islam to this day, while the West succumbed 
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to the destruction of native cultures and to sporadic, but virulent, anti-Semitism 
(Mazrui 1997). While Muslim practice has often fallen short of Muslim principles 
and the advent of the nation-state has created new tensions between national and 
sub-national identities, the religion of Islam is remarkable for its explicit precepts 
favoring cultural and religious pluralism (Qur’an, 2:256, 5:48, 10:47, 49:13, 109:6). 
 Today’s challenge for the West is to live up to its liberal tradition, which 
requires continual openness to new revelations of truth. Today’s challenge for 
Muslims is no more than the expansion of the original ideas of Islam. A retreat to a 
cultural ghetto by any group, be it Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Buddhist or Hindu, is 
not only a denial of the rich diversity of the modern cultural experience, but also a 
rejection of responsibility for future generations. Retreat is one of two faces of 
fundamentalism, which we define as a pathology of culture that arises when a group 
takes a subset of the basic tenets of a tradition and – either under the pressure of 
insecurity (in the case of today’s Muslims) or in the pursuit of hegemony and total 
security (in the case of the West) – uses them to seal off others or to maintain 
dominance. Islamic fundamentalism involves a militantly political re-appropriation 
of religious precepts; Western political fundamentalism is characterized by the 
canonization and propagation of an exclusive cultural and political narrative. 
 Popular slogans to the contrary, Islam and the West are not inherently 
incompatible. The first story – the ‘incompatibility’ story of many political and 
strategic analyses – informs us of tensions that do in fact exist, but it neglects the 
deep resonances between Islamic and Western civilizations that are cited by the 
reformers and specialists who narrate the second story. The third story exists only in 
the form of a working outline; we have attempted here to suggest the contents of 
future narratives that draw lessons from ongoing dialogue. 
 The third story points to the prospect of a cooperative, nonadversarial 
relationship between Islamic and Western civilizations. Such a relationship would 
be premised not on ideas of cultural triumphalism, but on mutual respect and 
openness to cultural eclecticism. Muslims and Westerners can learn from each other 
and cooperate in the pursuit of humane values.  Seeming contradictions will have to 
be dealt with on a higher plane. If Western individualism is to bring lasting 
happiness to the individual, new models of ‘free community’ will have to be 
explored; if Muslim ideals of community are to reach their fulfillment, it will be 
necessary to revisit traditions that underscore the dignity of the individual. Muslims 
can benefit from the Western experience with political pluralism, and Westerners 
can benefit from the spirit of Islamic cultural pluralism. 
 All who identify with Islam and with the West can become co-authors of a new 
story. We need a new story to tell, and the story we begin to tell today has a bearing 
on the story we will tell tomorrow. We are all heirs of the story of conflict. If we 
leave aside tired generalizations and seek to know one another, we can become the 
architects of a truly new order of cooperation. 
 
Conclusion:  The Changing Context of Human Spirituality 
 
 We stand at the conjunction of two perspectives. One is the emotional 
perspective felt by many Westerners – the view that, if not for the revival and 
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increasing political activism of non-Western cultural traditions such as Islam, all 
would have been well. This perspective points to the calamitous events of 
September 11, 2001 and states that its peace has been shattered. The other 
perspective – a perspective of hopelessness that is common among Muslims as well 
as members of many other non-Western cultural traditions – is born of experiences 
of exclusion, suffering and resentment that have accumulated over a considerable 
period of time. From their perspective, peace and justice have long been absent 
from the world. A precarious and even humiliating state of existence has been the 
norm, not peace. 
 Where do we go from here? What contribution can faith make to this state of 
affairs? We need to experience ourselves in relationship, not out of relationship. In a 
world of collapsing boundaries, cultures need to experience their commonality. This 
is necessary if the suffering that Americans and Westerners are undergoing in the 
face of scourges like terrorism is to find its counterpoint in the suffering of those 
who turn to militant belief systems or who are unable to prevent their companions 
from doing so. 
 In other words, divergent worlds of perception – Islam and the West, the South 
and the North – must move from isolation toward unity. To do so, we need to 
stimulate reflection, find meaning in mutual tragedies and share our most sacred 
values, including our conceptions of peace. Such activities permit a search for 
meaning and commonality. The discovery of commonality, in turn, makes 
reconciliation possible, through the re-identification and reaffirmation of the core 
spiritual precepts upon which our religious narratives, images and values have been 
built. In the process, we may also derive common responses to shared human 
suffering. 
 While we in no way wish to denigrate traditional religious commitments, we 
believe that, at the present juncture of human development, it is useful to make a 
distinction between spirituality and religion, even though the terms are often used 
interchangeably because both refer to matters of faith. The term religion refers to an 
institutional framework within which a specific theology is pursued, usually among 
a community of like-minded believers. Spirituality, on the other hand, transcends 
the boundaries of religion, suggesting broader human involvement that comes from 
the inner essence of a person. At the level of the individual, it refers to action borne 
of a deep commitment that is not necessarily derived from allegiance to a particular 
religion. 
 In conclusion, we affirm that achieving a unifying global consensus as the basis 
for a humane, ecologically viable, new global system is possible. The essence of 
such a vision must be felt as well as rationally argued, because it involves both the 
head and the heart. From this perspective, a new global system requires new 
political and social arrangements, a new (or renewed) vision of humankind’s 
existential reality and purpose, and an unrelenting effort to make the former truly 
reflect the latter. This is an agenda for conflict resolution that is worthy of the best 
in human nature and experience. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. When we speak of Islam and the West, we need to raise the following questions: 
Which Islam and which West are we discussing? How are we representing the West 
(geographically as well as culturally and intellectually)? Who represents the 
“West”? Is the development of the West a finished product, or is the West still 
developing? Furthermore, what are we representing as Islam? Who represents 
“Islam”? Is Islam a static set of authoritative cultural norms, or is Islam a dynamic, 
spiritual response to life based on essential precepts? 
 
2. Hegel also saw history as a grand unfolding of reason. 
 
3. In the words of Mona Abul-Fadl (1987), “it is wajh Allah, the Countenance of 
Allah, which [the sincere Muslim] seeks.... The serene and contented self, al Nafs al 
Radiya al Mardiya, and the self which has found its innermost sense of peace, al 
Nafs al Mutma’inna, are anchored in that infinite and unassailable source from 
which they draw” (p. 25). 
 
4. From the beginning, Islamic rule was expected to have a contractual basis. The 
sovereign was to exercise power representing both the will of the community and 
the traditions of the Prophet. After experiences with political turmoil, de facto 
monarchy, and invasion, some Muslim thinkers began to preoccupy themselves with 
duties of obedience to a sovereign who fulfilled certain basic minimum 
requirements with respect to the Shari’a.   
 
5. Falk unequivocally defends the right of Muslims to equitable participation as 
Muslims in the contemporary world order, and suggests that contemporary Islamic 
movements manifest resistance to cultural as well as political marginalization. 
Michael Salla has advanced a similar argument. Salla suggests that there is a need to 
move beyond both stereotypical ‘essentializations’ and fragmentary models based 
on historical contingency, toward representations of Islam as a discourse that 
critiques the dominant liberal democratic paradigm in a manner similar to many 
other religious discourses. 
 
References 
 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammad. 1996. “Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context: Some 
Conceptual Questions”, Peace & Change. Vol. 21, No. 1. January, pp. 22-
40. 
Abul-Fadl, Mona. 1987. “Community, Justice, and Jihad:  Elements of the Muslim 
Historical Consciousness”, The American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 13-30. 
Augsburger, David. 1992. Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and 
Patterns. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press.  
Avruch, Kevin. 1998. Culture and Conflict Resolution. Washington, DC:  United 
States Institute of Peace Press. 
Said & Funk 49
Bateson, Gregory and Mary Catherine Bateson. 1987. Angels Fear: Towards an 
Epistemology of the Sacred. New York: Bantam Books. 
Burton, John. 1990. Conflict:  Resolution and Provention. New York:  St. Martin’s 
Press. 
Dallmayr, Fred R., ed. 2000. Border Crossings: Toward a Comparative Political 
Theory. New York: Lexington Books. 
Falk, Richard. 1997. “False Universalism and the Geopolitics of Exclusion:  The 
Case of Islam”, Third World Quarterly. Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 7-23.   
Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton. 1991. Getting to Yes:  Negotiating 
Agreement Without Giving. 2nd edn. New York: Penguin Books. 
Galtung, Johan. 1997. “Conflict Life Cycles in Occident and Orient”, in D. P. Fry 
and K. Bjorkqvist, eds, Cultural Variation in Conflict Resolution: 
Alternatives to Violence. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Irani, George E. and Nathan C. Funk. 1998. “Rituals of Reconciliation:  
Arab-Islamic Perspectives”, Arab Studies Quarterly. Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 
53-73. 
Laue, James H. 1988. “Contributions of the Emerging Field of Conflict Resolution”, 
in W. Scott Thompson and Kenneth M. Jensen, eds, Approaches to Peace: 
An Intellectual Map. Washington, DC:  United States Institute of Peace 
Press. 
Lederach, John Paul. 1995. “The Mediator’s Cultural Assumptions”, in Jim 
Stutzman and Carolyn Schrock-Shenk, eds, Mediation and Facilitation 
Training Manual: Foundations and Skills for Constructive Conflict 
Transformation. 3rd edn. Akron:  Mennonite Conciliation Service, pp. 80-
82. 
Mazrui, Ali. 1997. “Islamic and Western Values”, Foreign Affairs. Vol. 76, No. 5, 
Sept/Oct, pp. 118-132. 
Reiss, Hans, ed. 1991. Kant: Political Writings. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tarnas, Richard. 1991. The Passion of the Western Mind. New York: Ballantine 
Books. 
Said, Abdul Aziz, Nathan C. Funk and Ayse S. Kadayifci, eds. Peace and Conflict 
Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice. Lanham: University Press of 
America, 2001. 
Said, Abdul Aziz, Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Charles O. Lerch, III. 1995. Concepts 
of International Politics in Global Perspective, 4th edn. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, Inc. 
Salla, Michael. 1997. “Political Islam and the West: A New Cold War or 
Convergence?” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 729-742. 
Satha-Anand, Chaiwat. 1996. “The Politics of Forgiveness: Islamic Teachings and 
Gandhi’s Teachings”, in The Nonviolent Crescent: Two Essays on Islam 
and Nonviolence. Alkmaar: International Fellowship of Reconciliation. 
Scimecca, Joseph A. 1991. “Conflict Resolution in the United States:  The 
Emergence of a Profession”, in Kevin Avruch, et al. eds, Conflict 
Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
                                                                                                       50 The Role of Faith
Wehr, Paul and John Paul Lederach. 1993. “Mediating Conflict in Central 
America”, Journal of Peace Research.  Vol. 38, August, pp. 331-346.
 A JOURNEY INTO THE FUTURE: 
 IMAGINING A NONVIOLENT WORLD1 
 
 
Elise Boulding 
 
 
 The inspiration for this essay came to me after a daylong workshop on 
Imagining a Nonviolent World which I offered for prisoners at the Massachusetts 
Correctional Institution at Norfolk on a wintry Saturday morning. This type of 
imaging workshop first evolved in the late 1970s, as I began to realize that we peace 
activists, working to bring about a nonviolent world without war, really had no idea 
how a world in which armies had disappeared would function. How could we work 
to bring about something we could not even see in our imaginations? Stepping back 
into the 1950s in my own mind, I remembered translating Fred Polak’s Image of the 
Future from the Dutch original, a macrohistorical analysis that showed a 
war-paralyzed and depressed Europe how past societies in bad situations but with 
positive images of the future had been empowered by their own imaginations to 
work to bring the imaged future about. Here was a possible answer!  
I worked with Warren Ziegler and other colleagues to develop a workshop 
format that took people 30 years into the future – to a world at peace. The format 
allowed time for imaginative exploration of ‘how things worked’ in that future, 
followed by a remembering, looking back from this future to the present to imagine 
how all this peaceableness had come about. The workshops always closed with time 
for personal commitments to action in the present to help bring about the future 
participants had pictured. We found that this type of workshop actually empowered 
people in their peace activism. 
But these workshops had involved participants free to be change agents in their 
world. How could prisoners imagine a more caring world, let alone see themselves 
as agents to bring those changes about? To make the leap into the future less 
daunting, I chose ten rather than 30 years as the time span. How would they deal 
with 2010 in their imaginations? Well, I found out. After explaining about the failed 
hopes from peace and justice efforts in the past and the new hopes for peace and 
justice action as we stood on the threshold of the twenty-first century, I asked them 
what they might hope to find in 2010. Through individual reflection and small 
group discussion, they constructed a list of hopes. The first major theme in their 
hopes was: 
 
To be at peace with ourselves and one another and the world in 
which we live. To recognize, understand, communicate what is 
going on.  
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Further themes followed:  
 
There should be a peaceful environment for all mankind: no wars, 
hunger, homelessness, disease, violence, racism, no TV 
commercials and no pollution.  
 
People listen to and respect one another. There is equality, just laws 
and freedom from fear. 
 
Life is local; families are peaceful. There is strong community 
feeling and conflict resolution. People help each other and have fun 
together. 
 
 Those were the hopes expressed for what might be found in the future. The 
hopes themselves were more well-defined than I had expected. What their 
imaginations revealed when they mentally traveled into the future and then drew 
pictures of what they imagined, was deeply moving. Prison walls had melted away 
and all the beauties of nature and the life of free humans stood revealed: open 
countryside, trees, bushes, flowers, distant mountains, lakes and rivers, farmlands, 
with houses dotting the landscape, often a church in sight. A few drawings pictured 
villages, malls with shops and people walking about in the malls. One of the most 
striking features of these pictures was the presence of sunlight and other sources of 
light: lamps, candles, lighthouses and beacon lights. 
 Everywhere in these pictures were friendly, often smiling people – walking in 
couples, bicycling, singing, dancing, playing games, working in small groups, 
fishing by a lake, growing food, offering helping hands to each other, walking to 
church, seated in meditation and praying. One picture revealed housing being built 
for the homeless; another, the opening up and transformation of a prison. Two 
pictured bombs dropping on a city with the caption, “THIS MUST NOT 
HAPPEN!” The absence of cars in these pictures was notable. 
 The themes of open green spaces, the beauty of nature, sunlight, friendly 
sociability and joyful activity had significant similarities to the themes in the 
pictured futures of workshop participants that I had been collecting for years. 
Whether the participants were peace and social change activists, members of 
women’s, youth or church groups, diplomats, soldiers, scholars or teachers, their 
pictures suggested a bright, clean, green world and conveyed the ‘feel’ of a joyful 
local community in which people delight in celebrations, in caring for others. Why 
should I have been surprised that prisoners could imagine that same world? 
Whatever impacts prison had on their lives, these men who participated in the 
weekly Meetings for Worship at Norfolk had vibrant social and spiritual 
imaginations. 
 After the participants had worked together in groups of four or five to develop 
more details about the kind of changes in economic, political and social institutions 
that would keep this peaceful world functioning, each group was asked to present a 
short pantomime that would convey what it was like to live in that future. Once 
again, the liveliness of their imaginations showed through. The pantomimes of 
Elise Boulding 53
facing differences and resolving them peacefully, of cooperation in difficult tasks, 
of going from loneliness to joyful community, could have been the pantomimes 
produced in very different workshops settings. 
 The Remembering History exercise was done with the same zest. The future 
they had delineated was of course one that would have required at least the 30-year 
time lapse specified in the usual Imagining a Nonviolent World workshop, but since 
the decision had been taken to set the imagined future only ten years away, there 
was a tacit acceptance of a strategy of speeding up time! 
 Standing mentally in the peaceful, prison-free 2010, the participants 
‘remembered’ what had happened over the previous decade. In 2009 (just last year) 
there had been a great celebration of the emergence of a new personal/global 
consciousness which was making power struggles obsolete; also a more effective 
successor to the UN was now functioning – a system of local-global governance. 
The last nuclear weapons were now destroyed and prisons transformed into 
rehabilitation centers. The year 2003 saw contact with beings in outer space, a surge 
in community dancing and music-making, the end of substance abuse and the 
implosion of the Pentagon. The year 2007 saw reparations to African-Americans, 
replacement of private cars by public transport, decline in materialism, elimination 
of the U.S. arms budget and its replacement by equivalent funding of peacebuilding 
activities including the work of the UN successor organization. This year also saw 
the achievement of zero population growth for the planet. The year 2006 witnessed 
the return to Native American peoples by the United States government of the lands 
previously taken from them; the development of a global food distribution system 
that drastically reduced hunger and human services that drastically reduced 
homelessness. Also a real Middle East peace treaty was signed by all the countries 
of the world. In 2005 the successor organization to the UN was able to administer 
effective pollution controls and people now enjoyed clean air. Human needs budgets 
and health services greatly increased, along with global immunization against 
AIDS, as did overall life chances for those who had been poor. In 2004 the process 
began of dismantling prisons as punitive institutions, and crime rates dropped 
drastically. The increase in human services, public housing and education began 
equalizing opportunities for people everywhere. City playgrounds were now safe 
spaces. 
 In 2003 the new successor organization to the UN, known as the ESO, or Earth 
Survival Organization, established an Educational Resources Council to improve 
learning worldwide and made recycling of all processed goods universally 
mandatory. Social movements worldwide emphasized the importance of public 
celebration, dancing and support of all the arts. Hopeful attitudes toward the future 
began to replace earlier despair, and greed declined. In 2002 the United Nations was 
officially transformed into the Earth Survival Organization (ESO), accompanied by 
great celebrations and dancing everywhere. All technological development was now 
shifted toward saving the planet. A gradual exodus from prisons is under way as 
new community support systems develop that enable former prisoners to rejoin their 
families and share their wisdom with their communities. 
 The year 2001 witnessed a global ban on the production and deployment of 
nuclear weapons by a changing and evolving UN, and the development of national 
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gun control programs in every country. The logging industry comes to an end as 
wood substitutes are developed, and the world’s forests are saved. The Internet 
involves more and more citizens worldwide in communications systems that support 
cooperation and peace. Power struggles no longer attract adherents. In 2000 the 
United States elects its first woman president, and moves toward being a softer, 
gentler nation. The seeds of a new consciousness are being sown. The 
environmental and peace movements become allies. Are these the kinds of issues 
and developments prisoners think about during long years behind bars? For the 
prisoners in this workshop, the answer is yes. 
 The point of ‘remembering history’, working back from the future to the 
present, is to help participants decide what action strategies they personally will 
commit themselves to in the present, in order to bring the desired future about. What 
kind of freedom of action do prisoners have? What could they possibly commit to? 
Each participant contributed his own thoughts on this and six action themes could 
be identified from their statements. By far the most frequently mentioned action 
theme was (1) inner peace and personal development. This was expressed in the 
following phrases: Find inner peace; find out who I am; get more grounded; develop 
myself physically, spiritually, mentally; continue studies; read sacred literature; 
become more forgiving, more patient and more nonviolent; stay focused; and deal 
righteously. 
 The next two most frequently mentioned themes were, respectively: (2) tell 
people good things; help others; share with family and friends; network with others, 
and (3) speak up when necessary; share my truths with the world; write letters; write 
a book. At least two people proposed the next two themes: (4) work with AVP 
(Alternatives to Violence Program) and (5) respond directly to bad situations when 
things go amiss. Lastly, theme (6) was a commitment to more ecological awareness, 
to consuming less. Challenging commitments, all of them! 
 That persons with such severe limitations on their daily activities and personal 
space can not only visualize a positive future for the society which has in so many 
ways rejected them, but have the inner resources and moral integrity to consider 
concrete personal actions that could help bring about such a future, suggests how 
vastly we underestimate the capacities and potentials of our fellow human beings. 
These human capacities are to be found among the men and women incarcerated in 
the prisons of our country. Kenneth Boulding always used to say, “what exists, is 
possible”. We have many more potential co-workers in the task of building a more 
peaceful world than we ever knew. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. This article is a slightly edited version of the article which originally appeared in 
the Friends Journal in December 1999. 
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